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SUMMARY 
 
 
1. Solomon Islands and the European Community initialled a Fisheries Partnership Agreement in 
February 2004 that eventually entered into force on 9 October 2006. This agreement is part of 
a network of three EC bilateral fisheries agreements in the Western Central Pacific Ocean 
which also includes Kiribati and Federated States of Micronesia. The agreement with Solomon 
Islands is a tuna agreement that includes fishing possibilities for a maximum of 4 tuna purse 
seiners and 10 surface longliners in the waters under jurisdiction of Solomon Islands. The 
financial contribution of the EC is a minimum of € 400,000 per year, of which 30% (€ 120,000) 
is earmarked for support to a multiannual programme aimed at supporting the implementation 
of a National Fisheries Policy. The current protocol to the Agreement expires on 8 October 
2009. The agreement with Solomon Islands has a limited impact on Community budget 
(accounting for 0.2% of EC financial commitments for bilateral fishing agreement and 0.05% of 
the total budget of DG MARE).  
 
2. Solomon Islands are an archipelagic country located in the Pacific South West 1,900 km 
North-East of Australia and populated by 500,000 inhabitants. Solomon Islands are included in 
the group of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) and are also a Small Island Developing 
State (SIDS). After years of economic growth, forecasts published by the International 
Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank are alarming. The logging sector is the main 
pillar of the national economy (66% of export earnings and 20% of Government tax revenue) 
but is expected to decline rapidly, reflecting the current unsustainable exploitation rates. As a 
consequence, forex reserves are expected to decline dramatically and Government budget 
might become even more dependent on International Aid, which already represents half of 
current Government revenues. The macro-economic future of Solomon Islands hinges 
critically on the success of developing other sectors of the economy, including mining, palm oil 
and fishing. 
 
3. The EEZ of Solomon Island is included in the largest tuna fishing ground in the world. The 
contribution of the fishing sector to the national economy is significant, as it represents roughly 
14% of GDP, 12% of export earnings (of which more than half originate from trade of 
processed tuna with the EC) and 7% of Government revenues (excluding international aid). 
The main contribution to the national economy is derived from the sale of fishing licences to 
Distant Water Fishing Nations tuna fleets (approx. € 8.1 million receipts in 2007) and through 
the development of a national fishing industry, which consists of a fleet of industrial tuna 
vessels that supply an export-oriented shore processing industry. The artisanal fishing sector 
contributes significantly to poverty alleviation in coastal communities.  
 
4. Solomon Islands are an ACP country. In 2006, the EC has adopted a new strategy for a 
strengthened cooperation with ACP Pacific States aiming at reinforcing political dialogue and 
at improving delivery of aid focusing on governance, regional integration and sustainable 
management of natural resources, including fisheries. This last sector is not included in the 
focal sector of EC cooperation at national level but receives considerable support under the 
EC regional cooperation strategy. The 10th EDF considers a € 40 million financial envelope for 
management of natural resources. Several other development programmes had already been 
funded under the previous EDFs to improve scientific knowledge on Pacific fisheries and to 
foster economic development. In Solomon Islands, the EC has also supported the national 
fishing sector under the STABEX 1998 funding. 
 
5. The tuna fishery of the Western Central Pacific Ocean represents more than half of world tuna 
catches, far ahead the Indian Ocean tuna fishery (25% of world catches), Eastern Pacific 
Ocean (14%) and Atlantic Ocean (8%). The catch in 2007 broke a new record at nearly 
2,400,000 tonnes including 73% (approx. 1,740,000 tonnes) caught by the purse seine fleet, 
10% (about 230 000 tonnes) by the longline fleet, and the remainder by other fishing fleets. 
The first sale value of purse seine catch was estimated close to € 1.7 billion in 2007 while 
longline catch value was about € 850 million. Almost 80% of purse seine catch is taken from 
the EEZ of the 8 coastal state signatories of the Nauru Agreement, of which Solomon Islands, 
Kiribati and Federated States of Micronesia are party.  
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6. The purse seine tuna fleet active in the Western Central Pacific Ocean totalled 213 vessels in 
2007. The fishery is dominated by interests flying the flag of Japan (35 purse seiners), Taiwan 
(34 purse seiners) and Korea (28 purse seiners), and a maximum of 40 US purse seiners 
operating under a multilateral Treaty concluded between the USA and the Pacific Islands. 
Over these last few years, the Pacific Coastal States have developed an important fishing 
capacity with 41 purse seiners flagged to Papua New Guinea and 10 flagged to Vanuatu. With 
3 active vessels over the last three years, EC purse seiners (Spanish flag) account for less 
than 1% of total purse seine fishing capacity and catch. The number of active longliners in the 
Western Central Pacific varies between 4,000 and 5,000 units, flying the flags of Taiwan, 
China, Korea or Pacific Coastal States. The EC longline fleet includes between 8 and 15 
vessels targeting swordfish in the Southern latitudes. Catch of the EC longline fleet represents 
less than 1% of total longline catch but 14% of total reported swordfish catch. 
 
7. The fishing strategy of the EC purse seine fleet comprises exploitation of tuna resources 
present in both the Eastern Pacific Ocean and in the Western Central Pacific Ocean. Fishing 
operations are centred on Kiribati where a logistic base has been created. The EC purse seine 
fleet exploits the waters of the Western Central Pacific when fishing in the Eastern Pacific is 
not possible (seasonal closures) or when the tuna resource is concentrated in the Western 
part of the Pacific Ocean as a result of the prevailing environmental conditions (such as La 
Niña episode in 2007/2008). Fishing operations take place in the high seas, in the EEZ of 
Coastal States having concluded bilateral agreements with the EC (Solomon Islands, Kiribati 
and Federated States of Micronesia) and in the EEZ of Tuvalu and Nauru where Spanish 
shipowners have negotiated private access agreements. Catches of the EC purse seine fleet 
in the Pacific supply predominantly the canneries controlled by Spanish interests in Ecuador 
but can also be sold to canneries in Thailand or in American Samoa. EC external trade data 
show that the EC purse seine fleet never exported raw material to Solomon Islands industries. 
The EC surface longliners work across all the Pacific Ocean but in southern latitudes far from 
the Solomon Islands EEZ.  
 
8. The most recent evaluations of tuna resource concluded that the skipjack stock, the main 
target species of purse seiners, is not in an overfished state. However, yellowfin stock is at 
least fully exploited and there is a 50% chance that overfishing is occurring. The bigeye stock 
is confirmed as overfished. Scientific advice recommends a 30% reduction of fishing effort on 
these two last species to maintain the stocks within safe limits. The fishing effort reduction 
objective concerns both purse seine fleets and longline fleets.  
 
9. The management and conservation framework of the Western Central Pacific tuna stocks falls 
under the competency of the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), a 
RFMO to which the EC is a contracting party, and is also based on measures adopted by 
coastal states for fisheries in the waters under their jurisdictions. In 2008, the WCPFC adopted 
a range of management and conservation measures that includes fishing effort limitations in 
the high seas (the EC purse seine fleet effort is limited to 103 fishing days) and seasonal 
restrictions on the use of Fish Aggregating Devices (FAD) and a possible moratorium on 
fishing in certain high sea pockets. The coastal states parties to the Nauru agreement, which 
are the most important as far as purse seine fishing is concerned, have adopted a limitation of 
fishing effort in their EEZ consistent with scientific recommendations, plus a set of restrictive 
measures in the high sea areas neighbouring their EEZ as additional conditions attached to 
the fishing licences granted (prohibition of fishing in certain high sea pockets, prohibition of 
fishing under FAD). The arrangement implemented for limiting fishing effort is the Vessel Days 
Scheme (VDS). This Arrangement operates by establishing an overall limit on the number of 
days that can be fished by purse seine vessels operating in the EEZs of the Parties to the 
Palau Arrangement. Importantly, the VDS does not provide for access rights on a flag basis, 
but allows Coastal States to grant access to purse seine fleets they might choose to select on 
the basis of their own criteria. The analysis of the management and conservation framework 
shows that coherent groups of Coastal States can successfully impose regulatory measures 
on Distant Water Fishing Nations fishing fleets, which are subsequently incorporated in the 
overall legal framework by the competent RFMO. 
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10. Enforcement of management measures in the national EEZ, including fight against IUU 
fishing, falls under the competency of Solomon Islands Authorities. Control means include 
VMS, observers onboard fishing vessels, three patrol vessels and occasional external support 
for aerial surveillance. The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) provides a significant technical 
assistance to its Member States in this domain, notably through the centralised management 
of an harmonised VMS system, the maintenance of a register of authorised fishing vessels, 
the coordination of the regional network of observers, and the organisation of joint surveillance 
operations pooling the control resources of its Member States and that of supporting 
developed countries (Australia, France, New-Zealand, USA). 
 
11. At National level, Solomon Islands have adopted a Fisheries Policy aiming at improving the 
management framework of national coastal fisheries and at obtaining increased benefits from 
foreign industrial tuna fleets licensed to fish in the EEZ. This latter axis considers further 
increase of the tuna processing capacities underpinned by a strategy to offer incentives to 
international tuna fleets to supply the local industries. This strategy considers the use of the 
VDS to favour access to foreign fleets that would bring socio-economic contributions to the 
national sector. Whilst the Fisheries Policy is ambitious, budget resources to implement it are 
scarce. The development budget of the Ministry in charge of fisheries (around € 2.5 million per 
year) is mainly funded by International Donors (principally New-Zealand, Japan and the EC 
through STABEX) with limited contribution from the State. The predictability of development 
budgets appears also low.  
 
12. The utilisation of fishing possibilities negotiated under the current protocol has been good for 
tuna purse seiners (100% of the 4 possible fishing licences have been requested) but 
disappointing for surface longliners (7 licenses drawn out of 10 possible the first year, nothing 
thereafter). However, the reference tonnage of 6,000 tonnes, used to value the EC financial 
contribution, is far from having been reached. EC catches in the Solomon Islands EEZ were 
nil the first year of the agreement and around 600 tonnes the second year (10% of the 
reference tonnage). Catches in the third year are unknown as yet. These indicators show that 
the economic cost-effectiveness ratio of the bilateral agreement with Solomon Islands is low, 
and largely below the ratio estimated for EC tuna agreements in other regions. Additionally, 
because of the small size of the EC fleet potentially concerned by this Agreement, the 
contribution of the agreement with Solomon Islands to the objectives of supporting the 
European fishing industry (EC employment, supply of the European market) is negligible. 
However, the agreement is estimated to contribute to secure the competitiveness of the 
European tuna fleet concerned by providing a legally stable framework for access to a EEZ 
potentially important as part of a regional deployment strategy. 
 
13. The partnership component included in the agreement has failed. Despite the terms of the 
Agreement and its associated protocol, the Joint Committee was never able to meet since the 
start of the Protocol. The EC and Solomon Islands never defined the components of the 
sectoral partnership aimed at implementing responsible fishing practices in the EEZ and at 
promoting EC investment. The analysis of the budget of the Ministry in charge of fisheries 
indicates that the part of the EC financial contribution earmarked for sectoral support (€ 
120,000 per year) has most likely been used for other purposes. The sectoral partnerships 
with the two other Pacific third countries subject to agreements (Kiribati and Micronesia) have 
been until now at the same low level. 
 
14. However, despite the disappointing achievements of the current agreement, there is an 
interest to conclude a new protocol. The EC purse seine fleet needs to maintain access to the 
EEZ of Solomon Islands in a context of limitation of its fishing rights in the high seas and 
further restrictions on fishing in the Eastern Pacific for conservation purposes. The interest in a 
new protocol to the Agreement is also political. The EC which has adopted a new cooperation 
strategy with Pacific ACP States and which has made strong commitments to combat IUU 
fishing, needs to keep a framework for sectoral policy dialogue with Coastal States. The 
continuation of the agreement with Solomon Islands is also important under the ambitious 
objective of preparing a regional fishing agreement with the 8 parties to the Nauru Agreement, 
according to the possibilities for reform of bilaterial fisheries agreements promoted in the 
Green Paper. As far as the Solomon Islands are concerned, a new agreement will secure 
multiannual budget revenues much needed to preserve the stability of the macro-economic 
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framework. In addition, the Agreement will provide the Ministry in charge of fisheries with 
recurrent national source of funding of its development budget complementary to International 
Aid.  
 
15. The continuation of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement policy with Pacific third countries 
along the lines adopted by the Council. and the preparation of a more ambitious regional 
fishing agreement both require that the European Commission should mobilise adequate 
resources. This has not been the case so far. A centralised management of these Pacific 
agreements from the Commission’s headquarters is not a viable solution. Even though the 
Pacific region represents a small proportion of EC payments for bilateral fishing agreements 
(less than 1%), the Commission should consider the assignment in the Pacific of a dedicated 
staff in charge of the daily monitoring of the Pacific Agreements, in order to maintain the 
credibility of its policy in the Pacific as well as in other regions of the world. 
 
*** 
* 
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RESUME 
 
1. Les Iles Salomon et la Communauté européenne ont paraphé en février 2004 un Accord de 
Partenariat dans le domaine de la Pêche qui est entré finalement en vigueur le 9 octobre 
2006. Cet Accord fait partie d’un réseau de trois Accords dans la région du Pacifique Central 
et Occidental qui inclut également le Kiribati et les Etats Fédérés de Micronésie. L’Accord 
avec les Salomon est un accord thonier qui prévoit l’accès d’un maximum de 4 thoniers 
senneurs et de 10 palangriers de surface à la ZEE sous juridiction. La contribution financière 
de la CE est au minimum de 400 000 € par an dont 30% (120 000 € par an) sont réservés au 
soutien à un programme pluriannuel venant en soutien à la mise en œuvre de la Politique 
Nationale de la Pêche. Le protocole d’Accord en cours expire le 8 octobre 2009. L’accord 
avec les Iles Salomon est de portée financière limitée pour le budget des Communautés 
(0,2% des engagements financiers de la CE sous les accords bilatéraux et 0,05% du budget 
total de la DG MARE). 
 
2. Les Iles Salomon forment un archipel situé dans le Pacifique Sud-Ouest à 1 900 km dans le 
Nord-Est de l’Australie et peuplé d’environ 500 000 habitants. Les Salomon font partie du 
groupe des 50 pays les moins avancés (PMA) et sont en outre classés dans la catégorie des 
Petits États Insulaires en Développement. Après des années marquées par une forte 
croissance, les prévisions économiques publiées par la Banque Asiatique de Développement 
et le Fonds Monétaire International sont plutôt alarmantes. L’exploitation forestière, qui 
constitue le principal pilier de l’économie nationale (66% des recettes à l’export et 20% des 
recettes fiscales du pays), devrait décroître sensiblement dans le futur en raison de taux 
d’exploitation non-soutenables. L’une des conséquences de cet affaiblissement sera une 
baisse très sensible des réserves de change, et un budget national qui reposera de plus en 
plus sur les apports de l’aide internationale, qui représente déjà la moitié des recettes 
budgétaires. L’avenir macro-économique des Iles Salomon repose sur les capacités 
nationales à développer d’autres secteurs de l’économie dont l’exploitation minière, l’huile de 
palme et la pêche. 
 
3. La ZEE des Iles Salomon fait partie de la plus grande zone de pêche thonière du monde. La 
contribution du secteur de la pêche à l’économie nationale est importante car elle représente 
environ 14% du PIB, 12% des recettes à l’exportation (dont plus de la moitié résultant du 
commerce de thons transformés avec la CE) et 7% des recettes du Gouvernement hors aide 
internationale. La contribution à l’économie est apportée à titre principal au travers de la vente 
d’accès à la ZEE à des flottes de pêche thonière étrangères (env. 8,1 M€ de recettes en 
2007) et par le développement d’une industrie nationale qui comprend une flotte de navires 
thoniers de type industriels qui approvisionnent une industrie exportatrice de transformation à 
terre. Le secteur de la pêche artisanale apporte également une contribution sensible à la lutte 
contre la pauvreté dans les communautés côtières. 
 
4. Les Iles Salomon font partie du groupe des Etats ACP. En 2006, la CE a adopté une nouvelle 
stratégie de coopération avec les Etats ACP du Pacifique visant à renforcer le dialogue 
politique et à mieux cibler son aide sur les secteurs de la gouvernance, de l’intégration 
régionale et de la gestion des ressources naturelles, dont la pêche. Ce secteur ne fait pas 
partie du domaine de concentration de la coopération de la CE à l’échelle nationale, mais 
bénéficie d’un soutien important au travers de la stratégie de coopération régionale. Le 10ème 
FED (2008-2013) prévoit ainsi de réserver 40 M€ au domaine de la gestion des ressources 
naturelles. Plusieurs programmes ont déjà été financé sous les FED précédents pour 
améliorer les connaissances scientifiques sur pêcheries du Pacifique et rechercher des axes 
de développement économique. A noter que pour les Iles Salomon, la CE a pu intervenir dans 
le domaine de la pêche grâce à des fonds du STABEX 1998. 
 
5. La pêcherie thonière du Pacifique Central et Occidental est à l’origine de plus de la moitié des 
captures mondiales de thonidés, loin devant la pêcherie de l’océan indien (25% des captures 
mondiales), du Pacifique oriental (14%) et de l’océan Atlantique (8%). Les captures en 2007 
ont atteint un record à près de 2 400 000 tonnes, dont 73% (env. 1 740 000 tonnes) est pêché 
par les navires senneurs, 10% (~ 230 000 tonnes) par les palangriers, et le solde par des 
engins de pêche divers. La valeur à la première vente des captures des senneurs était 
estimée proche de 1,7 milliards € en 2007, celle des palangriers à environ 850 M€. Près de 
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80% des captures des senneurs sont réalisées dans les ZEE de 8 pays tiers signataires de 
l’accord de Nauru dont font notamment partie les Iles Salomon, le Kiribati et la Micronésie. 
 
6. La flotte de pêche des senneurs actifs dans le Pacifique Central et Occidental comptait 213 
navires en 2007. La pêcherie est dominée par des intérêts battant pavillon du Japon (35 
senneurs), de Taiwan (34 senneurs) et de Corée (28 senneurs), ainsi que par une flotte de 
senneurs des USA exerçant au travers d’un accord multilatéral (40 senneurs au maximum). 
Les Etats insulaires du Pacifique Sud ont développé une capacité de pêche importante ces 
dernières années avec près de 41 senneurs de Papouasie Nouvelle Guinée et 10 du Vanuatu. 
Avec 3 navires actifs ces trois dernières années, les senneurs de la CE (pavillon Espagne) ne 
représentent qu’environ 1% de la capacité de pêche à la senne et des captures totales. Le 
nombre de palangriers actifs dans le Pacifique Central et Occidental varie entre 4 000 et 
5 000 unités battant pavillons de Taiwan, de la Chine, de Corée ou des Etats insulaires du 
Pacifique. La flotte palangrières de la CE compte entre 8 et 15 navires spécialisés sur 
l’exploitation de l’espadon dans les latitudes australes. Les captures palangrières 
européennes représentent moins de 1% des captures totales mais 14% des prises d’espadon 
déclarées. 
 
7. La stratégie des senneurs européens privilégie une exploitation des ressources thonières du 
Pacifique Oriental et de celles du Pacifique Central et Occidental. Les opérations de pêche 
sont centrées autour du Kiribati où une base d’escale a été créée. Les senneurs de la CE 
exploitent les eaux du Pacifique Central et Occidental quand la pêche n’est pas possible dans 
le Pacifique Oriental (fermetures saisonnières) ou quand les conditions environnementales 
font que la ressource se concentre dans la partie Ouest du Pacifique (épisode La Niña comme 
en 2007/2008). Les opérations de pêche se déroulent en haute mer, dans les ZEE des trois 
pays côtiers avec lesquels la CE a conclu des accords bilatéraux, et dans les ZEE de Tuvalu 
et de Nauru ou les armateurs espagnols ont négocié un accord d’accès privé. Les captures 
des senneurs européens sont destinées principalement aux conserveries contrôlées par des 
intérêts espagnols en Equateur mais peuvent être également vendues en Thaïlande ou aux 
Samoa Américaines. Les données du commerce extérieur européen indiquent que les 
senneurs de la CE n’ont pas vendu de matières premières aux industries des Iles Salomon. 
Les palangriers de surface européens travaillent également sur toute la largeur du Pacifique 
mais dans les latitudes australes loin de la ZEE des Iles Salomon. 
 
8. Les dernières évaluations de la ressource thonière indiquent que le stock de listao, principale 
espèce cible des senneurs, est dans un état satisfaisant. Par contre, le stock d’albacore serait 
dans un état de pleine exploitation avec un risque de situation de surpêche, et le stock de 
patudo est dans un état de surpêche avéré. Les avis scientifiques recommandent par 
conséquent une réduction de 30% de l’effort de pêche sur ces deux espèces afin de maintenir 
les stocks dans les limites de viabilité. L’objectif de réduction de l’effort concerne aussi bien 
les flottes de senneurs que les flottes palangrières. 
 
9. Le régime de gestion et de conservation des stocks thoniers de l’Océan Pacifique Central et 
Occidental repose d’une part sur la Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), 
une ORGP dont la CE est partie contractante, et d’autre part sur les mesures adoptées par les 
pays côtiers pour ce qui concerne les pêcheries dans les zones sous juridiction. La WCPFC a 
adopté en 2008 un ensemble de mesure de conservation et de gestion qui intègrent une 
limitation de l’effort de pêche des senneurs dans les zones de haute mer (la flotte des 
senneurs de la CE est limitée à 103 jours de pêche) plus des restrictions saisonnières portant 
sur l’utilisation de dispositifs de concentration des poissons (DCP) et un possible moratoire 
sur la pêche en haute mer. Les pays côtiers les plus importants pour la pêche à la senne, soit 
les pays signataires de l’accord de Nauru dont font partie les Iles Salomon, ont adopté le 
principe d’un gel du niveau de l’effort de pêche à des niveaux compatibles avec les avis 
scientifiques, plus des restrictions dans des zones de haute mer adjacentes à leurs ZEE 
comme conditions additionnelles à l’obtention de licences de pêche dans leurs zones 
(interdiction de pêche dans certaines zones de haute mer, interdiction de pêche sous DCP). 
Le mécanisme mis en œuvre pour limiter l’effort est celui du Vessel Days Scheme (VDS) qui 
fixe un maximum de nombre de jours de pêche que pourront utiliser les flottes de senneurs 
dans les ZEE des pays signataires de l’accord de Nauru, et qui répartit ce nombre maximum 
entre les parties à l’accord. Elément important, le VDS n’intègre plus de droits d’accès sur la 
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base du pavillon du navire, mais autorise les pays côtiers à allouer les jours de pêche aux 
flottes qu’ils choisissent de privilégier en fonction de leurs propres critères. L’analyse du 
régime de gestion et de conservation des pêcheries montre que les pays côtiers du Pacifique 
regroupés en ensembles cohérents arrivent à imposer des règles contraignantes aux flottes 
de pêche lointaines et qui sont ensuite reprises par l’ORGP compétente. 
 
10. Le contrôle du respect des mesures de gestion, y compris la lutte contre la pêche INN, dans la 
ZEE nationale est de la responsabilité des autorités des Iles Salomon qui disposent de 
quelques moyens de contrôle (VMS, observateurs embarqués ainsi que trois patrouilleurs plus 
appuis ponctuels extérieurs). Le Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) apportent une assistance 
technique importante à ses Etats membres dans ce domaine notamment par la gestion d’un 
système de VMS harmonisé, le maintien d’un registre centralisé des navires autorisés, la 
coordination du réseau d’observateurs embarqués et l’organisation d’opérations de 
surveillance conjointes mettant en commun les moyens des Etats membres du FFA plus ceux 
apportés par des pays développés (Australie, France, Nouvelle-Zélande, USA). 
 
11. A l’échelon national, les Iles Salomon ont adopté une politique des pêches qui vise 
notamment à améliorer le cadre de gestion des pêcheries nationales côtières et à capter 
davantage de bénéfices de l’activité des flottes thonières nationales et internationales 
autorisées à pêcher dans leurs eaux. Ce dernier axe considère le développement de 
capacités de transformation des thonidés à terre appuyé par une stratégie pour inciter les 
flottes thonières internationales à les approvisionner en matière première. Cette stratégie 
considère l’utilisation du cadre du VDS pour favoriser les flottes étrangères qui apporteront 
une contribution socio-économique au secteur national. Si la politique est ambitieuse, les 
ressources budgétaires pour la mettre en œuvre d’avèrent limitées. Le budget de 
développement du Ministère de la Pêche (autour de 2,5 M€ par an) est constitué en grande 
majorité de l’aide extérieure des bailleurs (principalement la Nouvelle-Zélande, le Japon et la 
CE au travers des fonds STABEX) avec peu de ressources nationales. La prévisibilité des 
budgets de développement s’avère également très faible. 
 
12. L’utilisation des possibilités de pêche négociées sous le protocole en cours a été bonne pour 
les thoniers senneurs (100% des 4 licences possibles ont été sollicitées) mais plus décevante 
pour les palangriers (7 licences sur 10 la première année, plus rien ensuite). Cependant, le 
tonnage de référence de 6 000 tonnes qui entre dans l’assiette du paiement de la contrepartie 
financière de la CE est loin d’avoir été atteint. Le total des captures dans la ZEE des Iles 
Salomon a été nul la première année et de l’ordre de 600 tonnes la deuxième année (10% du 
tonnage de référence). Les captures pour la troisième année ne sont pas encore connues. 
Ces indicateurs permettent de vérifier que le rapport coût efficacité économique de l’accord 
avec les Iles Salomon est défavorable et très au dessous de celui relevé pour les accords 
thoniers dans d’autres régions. En outre, du fait de la modestie de la taille des flottes 
européennes concernées par cet accord, la contribution aux objectifs communautaires de 
soutien au secteur de la pêche européen (emploi, approvisionnement du marché) est 
négligeable. L’accord apporte cependant un gain de compétitivité à la flotte des senneurs 
concernés en permettant un accès juridiquement stable à une ZEE potentiellement importante 
au sein d’une stratégie régionale. 
 
13. L’aspect partenariat sectoriel qui faisait partie intégrante de l’accord a été manqué. Malgré les 
dispositions de l’Accord et du Protocole associé, aucune réunion de la Commission mixte n’a 
eu lieu depuis l’entrée en vigueur de l’accord. La CE et les Iles Salomon n’ont pas défini les 
axes de la coopération sectorielle visant à instaurer des pratiques de pêche responsables 
dans la ZEE et à promouvoir l’investissement européen. L’analyse du budget du Ministère de 
la Pêche indique que la part de la contrepartie réservée à ce soutien sectoriel (120 000 € par 
an) a vraisemblablement été utilisée à d’autres fins. Le partenariat sectoriel prévu avec les 
deux autres pays tiers du Pacifique sous accord (Kiribati et Micronésie) est pour l’instant au 
même niveau. 
 
14. Malgré les résultats décevants de l’accord en cours, il existe un intérêt à renouveler le 
protocole à son échéance prochaine. La flotte des senneurs européens a en effet besoin de 
pouvoir conserver un accès à la ZEE des Salomon dans un contexte où ses droits de pêche 
en haute mer sont très réduits et ses possibilités de pêche dans le Pacifique Oriental se 
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réduisent du fait des mesures de gestion et de conservation adoptées. L’intérêt d’un nouveau 
protocole d’accord se trouve également au niveau politique. La CE, qui a pris des 
engagements de coopération vis-à-vis des Etats du Pacifique et qui s’est engagée à lutter 
contre la pêche illégale et à améliorer la gouvernance mondiale des pêches, doit pouvoir 
conserver un cadre de dialogue sectoriel avec les pays côtiers. La poursuite d’un accord avec 
les Salomon s’avère également importante dans l’optique plus ambitieuse de la préparation 
d’un accord de portée régionale avec les 8 pays signataires de l’accord de Nauru sur la 
lancée des pistes de réforme des accords bilatéraux proposées dans le Livre Vert. En ce qui 
concerne les Iles Salomon, un nouvel accord permettra au Gouvernement de sécuriser sur 
une période pluriannuelle une partie des recettes en devises cruciales pour la stabilité du 
cadre macro-économique, et au Ministère des Pêches de pouvoir réserver sur la même 
période pluriannuelle un budget d’origine nationale utilisable pour soutenir la mise en œuvre 
de la politique de la pêche en complément de l’action des bailleurs de fonds internationaux. 
 
15. La poursuite des accords de pêche bilatéraux avec les pays tiers du Pacifique conformément 
à leurs objectifs, ainsi que la préparation d’un accord plus ambitieux de portée sous-régionale, 
exige cependant que la Commission se dote des moyens pour y parvenir, ce qui n’a pas été le 
cas sur la période récente faute de ressources disponibles. La gestion centralisée de ces 
accords depuis le siège de la Commission n’est pas une solution viable. Malgré le fait que les 
accords du Pacifique ne représentent qu’une petite partie (moins de 1%) des engagements 
communautaires sous les accords bilatéraux, la Commission devrait envisager l’affectation 
dans le Pacifique d’un agent chargé de la gestion courante de ces accords sous peine 
d’affaiblir la crédibilité de ce volet de sa politique externe dans le Pacifique mais aussi dans 
d’autres régions du monde. 
 
*** 
* 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In February 2004, the European Community and Solomon Islands initialled the first ever fishing 
agreement between the two parties. The Fisheries Partnership Agreement eventually entered into 
force on 9 October 2006 upon completion of the ratification procedures. The current 3 year protocol 
setting out fishing possibilities and payments expires on 8 October 2009. 
 
This Agreement provides tuna only fishing possibilities for EU vessels fishing in the waters of the 
Solomon Islands. It includes fishing possibilities for up to 4 purse seiners and 10 surface longliners in 
the EEZ of Solomon Islands. Although the protocol considered a possible increase of the number of 
fishing licences for purse seine vessels from the second year of the protocol, the fishing possibilities 
have remained unchanged throughout. 
 
The Agreement also establishes a framework for partnership between the two parties with a view to 
defining a fisheries policy in the Solomon Islands and identifying the appropriate means to implement 
it, according to the EC policy to move from access agreements to Partnership Agreements aiming to 
strengthen the conditions to achieve sustainable fisheries. 
 
The EU financial contribution amounts at € 400,000 per year including 30% (€ 120,000) devoted to 
financial support to the implementation of the multi-annual sectoral programme supporting the 
partnership presented above. The contribution is based on a reference tonnage of 6,000 tonnes 
valued at € 65 per tonne like under all other tuna fishing agreements concluded by the EC. Having 
been initialled before the 2004 Council conclusions on the proposed 2002 reform of bilateral access 
agreements, the financial contribution could not include a specific additional envelope to be used for 
the promotion of sustainable and responsible fishing in Solomon Islands waters. 
 
The Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Solomon Islands is part of a network of three tuna 
agreements with other ACP coastal States in the Pacific Ocean. The first agreement in the Pacific 
region with Kiribati started in 2003 and was renewed in 2006 in response to a need expressed by EC 
tuna operators to deploy fishing operations in what remains the most productive tuna fishing ground in 
the World. It was followed by the agreement with Solomon Islands (entered into force in 2006) and 
Federated States of Micronesia (entered into force in 2007). 
 
The purpose of this evaluation study is to provide the European Commission with the data and 
technical analyses needed to prepare the negotiation of a new protocol of Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement (FPA) between the Community and Solomon Islands. Findings from this report could also 
be used to evaluate the Community policy with regard to this Agreement and to provide a basis for 
possible future negotiations. 
 
This final report presents information collected from various sources, including the European 
Commission and the professional association grouping EC shipowners concerned by the utilisation of 
fishing possibilities. It also includes the findings of a mission in Solomon Islands that took place 
between 15th June and 23rd June 2009 during which discussions could be held with Solomon Islands 
stakeholders to the agreement (Authorities, private sector). The mission also took advantage of the 
presence of FFA headquarters in Honiara to meet with representatives of this regional fishing 
organisation and discuss issues related to the regional coordination of MCS activities and the legal 
obligations stemming from the regional fisheries Treaties in force having an impact on foreign access 
to the regional tuna resource. 
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1. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Geography 
 
The Solomon Islands form an archipelago in the Southwest Pacific about 1,900 kilometres northeast of 
Australia. With terrain ranging from ruggedly mountainous islands to low-lying coral atolls, the 
Solomon Islands stretch in a 1,450-kilometer chain southeast from Papua New Guinea across the 
Coral Sea to Vanuatu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Maps of Solomon Islands 
 
The main islands of Choiseul, New Georgia, Santa Isabel, Guadalcanal, Malaita, and Makira have 
rainforested mountain ranges of mainly volcanic origin, deep narrow valleys, and coastal belts lined 
with coconut palms and ringed by reefs. The smaller islands are atolls and raised coral reefs. The 
Solomon Islands region is geologically active, and earth tremors are frequent. A powerful tsunami, 
triggered by an offshore earthquake of magnitude 8.1, struck the western Solomon Islands in April 
2007, washing away hundreds of homes and taking numerous lives.  
 
More than 90% of the islands were forested, but this has come under severe pressure from current 
logging operations. The coastal strips are sheltered by mangrove and coconut trees. Luxuriant 
rainforest covers the interiors of the large islands. Soil quality ranges from extremely rich volcanic to 
relatively infertile limestone. 
 
The EEZ of Solomon Islands covers an area of approx. 1.6 million km². By Pacific standards, it is a 
relatively small EEZ: Federated States of Micronesia EEZ covers an area of almost 3 million km² while 
the surface of the EEZ of Kiribati is of 3.5 million km². However, for comparison purpose, it should be 
noted that the EEZ of Solomon Islands is larger than the EEZ of Seychelles in the Indian Ocean (1.3 
million km²). 
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1.2. Population 
 
The population of Solomon Islands in 2007 was estimated by the United Nations at 496,000, which 
placed it as number 161st in population among the 193 nations of the world. In that year 
approximately 5% of the population was over 65 years of age, with another 40% of the population 
under 15 years of age (base 2008). 
 
According to the UN, the annual population growth rate for 2005–2010 is 2.3%, with the projected 
population for the year 2015 at 643,000. The population density in 2007 was 17 per sq km, but there 
are significant variations from island to island; moreover, most mountainous and heavily wooded areas 
are inaccessible, and most of the population is concentrated in the coastal regions. 
 
It was estimated by the Population Reference Bureau that 18% of the population lived in urban areas 
in 2001. The most populous islands are Malaita and Guadalcanal. Honiara, on Guadalcanal, is the 
largest town and chief port. Also the capital city, Honiara had a 2007 population of 66,000. According 
to the United Nations, the urban population growth rate for 2005 - 2010 is 4.1%. 
 
1.3. Macro-economic situation of Solomon Islands 
 
1.3.1. General situation and outlook 
 
Solomon Islands are one of the 50 Least Developed Countries (LDC) according to the UN 
classification. With a GDP measured by purchasing power parity (PPP) of 2 031 USD / capita, the 
country ranks 141st out of 170 countries with data (roughly at the same level than Comoros in the 
Indian Ocean). Its Human Development Index is 0.602 which gives the country a rank of 129th out of 
177 countries with data, an index comparable to that of India. Solomon Islands are also classified by 
the UN as a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) as are most, if not all, the Pacific Island Countries 
(PICs). 
 
According to the analysis of the Asian Development Bank, economic growth remained relatively high 
at 6.4% in 2008, supported by the momentum generated when prices for export commodities were 
rising and by an expansionary fiscal policy. Growth was below the 10.3% seen in 2007, when high 
rates of logging (and 29.6% growth) accounted for an estimated one quarter of economic growth, 66% 
of export earnings, and 16% of government revenue from internal sources. 
 
In 2008, exports of copra, cocoa, and fisheries products grew, but log exports declined by 5.1% in US 
dollar terms. The US dollar value of total merchandise exports increased by 2.8% in 2008. Commercial 
bank credit to the private sector, including that to individuals, grew by 34.3% in 2008, after growth of 
50.4% in 2007. Reflecting the expansion in aggregate demand, as well as rising prices of fuel and 
other imported items, inflation accelerated to average 16.5%, double the rate of 2007. On a year-on-
year basis, inflation peaked at 23.5% in September and ended the year at 19.3%. Strong demand and 
rising costs of imports contributed to a decline in official reserves, to below the central bank’s target of 
3 months of import cover by year-end. The real effective exchange rate of the Solomon Islands dollar 
remained relatively stable. A substantial rise in development spending and, to a lesser extent, a further 
increase in the Government’s wage bill resulted in a budget deficit for 2008, equivalent to 5.6% of 
GDP. In 2009, the projected budget deficit of 3.6% will likely exceed funding available from cash 
reserves. Government borrowing to bridge the gap is ruled out under the 2005 Honiara Club 
agreement1 between the country and its official creditors. Consequently, the Government will have 
little choice but to reduce public expenditure, unless it can secure additional donor funding. Logging 
rates have been above sustainable levels since 1992, reaching five times the sustainable rate in 2007. 
The commercially exploitable natural forest is expected to be fully depleted in another 4 years or so. 
Expected softer demand for logs from China due to economic downturn this year will translate into a 
reduction in logging rates. That may help the environment, but also trim economic growth. 
                                                 
1 The Honiara Club is a forum set up by the government of the Solomon Islands in 2005 to obtain debt relief 
from the country's official creditors. 
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Furthermore, the planned reopening of the Gold Ridge gold mine is looking uncertain as a result of 
difficulties in obtaining finance. 
 
GDP growth is forecast to ease to 2.2% in 2009 and 1.7% in 2010 as logging exports decline. A larger 
than expected fall in logging rates could entail GDP growth, and a huge widening of the current 
account deficit. Inflation is expected to trend down below 10% in 2009. The central bank needs to 
show strong action if it is to slow the depletion in foreign reserves and maintain macroeconomic 
stability. The Government could assist by reducing its recurrent expenditure, particularly on wages. 
Additional efforts are also called for to address the structural weaknesses that threaten the 
sustainability of growth. Developing alternatives to logging heavily depends on improving governance, 
economic management, infrastructure, and the business climate. 
 
According to the analysis carried out by the IMF under Article IV consultation carried out in 2008, the 
medium-term outlook hinges critically on the success of developing non-logging sources of growth, to 
offset the expected sharp decline in logging activity. The logging sector currently accounts for 20 
percent of government tax revenues and 65 percent of exports. But logging activity is expected to 
decline rapidly beyond 2009 and to become negligible by 2013, reflecting the unsustainably high rates 
of logging. Therefore, growth in other sectors, including mining (gold and nickel), palm oil production, 
fishing, tourism, and the services sectors, needs to be stimulated. In particular, gold mining operations, 
now scheduled to start in 2010, are critical to sustaining exports and foreign reserves once logging 
declines. 
 
1.3.2. The contribution of fisheries to the national economy 
 
¾ GDP 
 
According to estimates published by CBSI, contribution of the fishing sector to the real GDP would be 
close to 5%. However, this estimate does not include contribution to GDP of the processing sector 
(included under the manufacturing sector) nor non-monetary contribution from artisanal and 
subsistence activities. An ADB study published in 20012 sought to re-estimate the real contribution of 
the fisheries sector to the GDP and ended up on upward revised estimate of 13% for the year 1999. 
According to the EC funded DEVFISH project, the fisheries sector would now represent 14% of GDP 
in 2007. 
 
Table 1 : Estimated real GDP of Solomon Islands. Source : CBSI 
In Million SDB, index 1985=100 2005 2006 2007 
Agriculture 118.1 120.5 146.4 
Forestry 288.3 306.3 381.5 
Fishing 104.4 130.6 110.8 
Mining -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 
Manufacturing 137.1 141.0 147.6 
Electricity and Water 250.6 255.0 285.6 
Construction 52.9 70.6 94.6 
Retail and Wholesale trade 143.3 143.3 152.6 
Transport and Communication 146.7 187.6 225.9 
Finance 231.7 236.0 257.8 
Other services 135.4 144.2 153.8 
Non-monetary Food 169.6 174.3 179.2 
Non-monetary Construction 164.4 169.0 173.8 
Total 1 939.2 2 075.1 2 306.3 
% Fishing 5.4% 6.3% 4.8% 
                                                 
2 The Contribution of Fisheries to the Economies of Pacific Island Countries. Report prepared for the Asian 
Development Bank, the Forum Fisheries Agency, and the World Bank. December 2001 
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¾ External trade 
 
Forest Products from both round logs (c. 90%) and sawn timber continue to be the leading export 
earner for Solomon Islands and accounted for 65% of total export earnings in 2007. Fish products, 
whether whole or processed represented 12% of export earning in 2007 for a value of € 15.4 million.  
 
Table 2 : Balance of external trade of Solomon Islands. Source : CBSI 
In € million * 2005 2006 2007 
Exports f.o.b. 85.7 106.0 130.5 
of which logs 56.7 70.3 85.1 
of which Fish 9.7 15.9 15.4 
% Fish 11% 15% 12% 
    
Imports c.i.f. 120.4 152.4 186.4 
    
Balance of trade -34.6 -46.4 -55.9 
* converted from original figures in SDB 
 
The main fisheries products exported are frozen tuna either whole or in fillets (loins) accounting for 
65% of total fish export in 2007 (value of € 10.4 million). Other exports included canned tuna (27%, € 
4.4 million) and sashimi grade tuna (5%, € 1 million). The following figure shows an increase in exports 
of canned products (mainly to countries of the sub-region) and a small decrease of exports of frozen 
tuna.  
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Figure 2 : Value of exports of Solomon Islands fisheries products by category in 2006 and 2007, all 
markets included. Source : CBSI 
 
In terms of markets, the major export destinations are Europe, USA, Thailand, Australia, China, Japan, 
Hong Kong and other Pacific region countries. Imports of fisheries products into the European 
Community are virtually exclusively made up of loins used as raw material by the European canning 
industry (in Italy) with fairly small quantities of canned tuna imported into Spain (42 t in 2008). 
According to COMEXT data, the c.i.f. value of fisheries products exported from Solomon to the EC 
amounted to € 9 million in 2007, increasing to € 10.2 million in 2008. Assuming a c.i.f. additional cost 
equivalent to 5% of the f.o.b. price, it can be inferred that the European market absorbed 55% in value 
of Solomon Islands exports of fisheries products in 2007, and probably more in 2008. COMEXT data 
show also that there are no imports of fishery products from the EC into Solomon Islands, suggesting 
that European vessels do not sell catch to the Solomon Islands tuna processing industry, although 
some transhipments take place in ports of Solomon Islands. 
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Status of current Trade Relations between Solomon Islands and the EU 
 
As of May 2009, Solomon Islands were not part of any Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with 
the EU3. Papua New Guinea and Fiji are the only Pacific ACP States to have initialled an Interim EPA 
with the EU so far (ultimately signed by Papua New Guinea on 30/07/2009). However, Solomon 
Islands are one of the countries included in the special custom arrangement for the least developed 
countries (Reg (EC) 732/2008) and qualify for the GSP EBA (Everything but Arms) preference regime. 
The rules of origin applying to Solomon Islands fishery products exported to the EC are those in force 
for the GSP including catch by a vessel flying the National flag with at least 50% National ownership 
and subject to certain restrictions in terms of nationality of crew members. Cumulation with EC 
products is possible, but not with any of the Solomon Islands neighbouring countries. 
 
¾ Government revenues 
 
The following table shows that the total revenue and grants of Solomon Islands Government was in 
excess of € 200 million in 2007 (IMF estimate), with about half in the form of grant-financed 
development funding administered by donors. The fishing industry contributes to the Government 
revenue notably through a contribution to international trade taxes levied at both import and export 
levels and payment of licence fees by national and foreign operators for licensing.  
 
Table 3 : SI Governement revenue and grants, 2005-2007. Source : IMF 
in € million * 2005 2006 2007 (Est.) 
Total revenue and grants 158.5 179.7 208.0 
    
Total revenue 72.8 89.6 111.0 
    
Income and profits 20.4 24.2 30.2 
Goods & Services 22.2 25.9 34.2 
International trade 19.2 24.2 29.3 
Other revenue 11.0 15.4 17.2 
    
Grants 89.7 90.1 97.1 
* converted from original figures in SDB 
 
According to the CBSI, the Ministry of Fisheries collected in 2007 the equivalent of € 9.5 millions in 
non-tax revenue including 85% (i.e. € 8.1 millions) for overseas resources as payment of licensing 
fees by foreign vessels for fishing in the Solomon Islands EEZ. These € 8.1 millions represent 
approximately 7% of Government total revenue (not including grants). The revenue collected in 2007 
is much higher than those obtained in 2006 (€ 6.5 million). This increase is linked to favourable fishing 
conditions in the EEZ (warmer La Nina episode) and high prices for tuna species throughout 2007. 
The other major source of income from fishing licensing is made up of receipts from the US Multilateral 
Treaty and the FSM arrangement. In 2007, these amounted to slightly more than € 1 million (11% of 
total fisheries receipts), with receipts from the US Treaty representing alone about € 800,000. Other 
sources of income include the transhipment levies (€ 110,000 in 2007) and observer fees (€ 125,000 
in 2007). 
 
                                                 
3 In a note dated Dec. 2008, the Department of Trade justifies this position by stating that there are unacceptable 
provisions in the EPA text such as the lack of protection for infant industries, a ban on the use of export taxation 
and a standstill position which would lock in the current applied tariff structure. However, the Department notes 
that a relaxation of the rules of origin for canned fish (global sourcing) could have been a tangible benefit, 
although bound to decline rapidly as soon as the Doha round completes. 
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The fisheries partnership agreement between the EC and Solomon Islands generates alone a revenue 
of roughly € 480,0004 per year, equivalent to a modest 0.4% of total Government revenue in 2007, not 
including grants and 6% of fees paid by DWFNs for access to the tuna resource present in the 
Solomon Islands EEZ. 
 
¾ Employment 
 
Employment data in Solomon Islands are poor. Estimates produced by the IFM suggest that formal 
employment in the fisheries sector was nearing 5,200 jobs in 2004, approximately 10% of the total 
number of employees. A yet unknown, but probably high, number of jobs is supported by the informal 
fishing sector (subsistence and artisanal fishing). 
 
¾ Food supply 
 
According to the latest statistics published by FAO on the food balance sheet of fish and fisheries 
products, consumption of such products in Solomon Islands is high by Oceania standards (47.2 kg per 
caput per year in Solomon compared to 23.5 kg per caput per year on average for Oceania). Fish is an 
important component of the diet as it is estimated to cover 81.3% of animal proteins consumption and 
27.9% of total protein consumption. Most fisheries products consumed in Solomon Islands are derived 
from artisanal and subsistence fishing. Tuna caught by the industrial fleets in the waters of Solomon 
are traded on developed country markets. 
 
 
1.4. Relations with the European Community and other International Donors 
 
1.4.1. The EC cooperation strategy with Solomon Islands and the Pacific 
Region 
 
¾ Outline of the EC cooperation strategy 
 
The EC relations with the Pacific ACP countries are structured, and have been so for decades, first on 
the basis of the Lome Conventions, and now by the Cotonou Agreement. In political terms an 
important objective for the EC has been to underpin a successful stabilisation following decolonisation 
while supporting economic and social progress. Considering the political volatility experienced in a 
number of Pacific ACP countries, the Commission considers that this goal has not yet been 
convincingly attained. Research and evaluations indicate that the EC development assistance has had 
a positive impact in the region and that without it, growth would have been lower and social indicators 
poorer. However, analyses indicate that in the last decade overall economic growth remained sluggish 
on average and insufficient to reduce poverty. 
 
In 2006, the Commission tabled a proposal for a strengthened partnership with the Pacific Islands 
(document COM (2006) 248) further adopted by the Council. The strategy proposed consists of three 
components: 
 
• A strengthened relationship between the EU and ACP Pacific States and region to pursue a 
broad political dialogue mostly with and through the Pacific Islands Forum, but also at national 
level with key Pacific ACP countries in accordance with the provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement 
 
                                                 
4 Estimate of € 400,000 financial contribution + 4 purse seiners @ € 13,000 + 10 longliners @ € 3,000: 
configuration of full utilisation of fishing possibilities negotiated without additional payments for catches in 
excess of reference tonnage. 
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• More focused development action on three priorities: governance, regional integration and 
sustainable management of natural resources. Part of the latest, fisheries is seen as a sector 
with great potential for cooperation, including promotion of sustainable utilisation of resources 
and of good governance practices. 
 
• More efficient aid delivery: facilitation of donor coordination, a more efficient and effective 
cooperation with the smallest countries, and increased use of budget support are the three 
axis identified by the Commission. Concerning budget support, virtually not used so far, the 
Commission wishes to proactively support Pacific States in meeting EuropeAid eligibility 
criteria5. As a contribution to meeting these eligibility criteria, the EC led PEFA assessments of 
four ACP countries of the region, namely Timor-Leste, Samoa, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands 
(published Nov. 2008). 
 
In a resolution adopted in Feb. 2007 (document P6_TA (2007) 0022), the European Parliament 
welcomed the initiative of the Commission to develop the first EU integrated strategy for the Pacific 
after 30 years of cooperation. The EP emphasises the potential positive role of fisheries in the 
development of the Pacific Islands and supports the initiative of the Commission to support MCS and 
fight against IUU fishing. Interestingly, the EP encourages the Commission to negotiate any future 
tuna agreements with the entire region, rather than with individual States, given the high degree of 
regional integration of fishery management functions adopted by Pacific Island Countries. 
 
¾ Commitments for the 2008-2013 period under the 10th EDF 
 
At Solomon Islands level 
 
The Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme concluded between the EC and 
Solomon Islands for the period covered by the 10th EDF (2008-2013) acknowledge as focal sector of 
EC cooperation the sustainable rural development with capacity institutional building with an indicative 
allocation of € 11,220,000 representing 85% of the A-envelope (€ 13,200,0006). The focus of EC 
cooperation in Solomon Islands is primarily on agriculture and forestry, but may include artisanal and 
subsistence fisheries. However, fisheries remain outside the focal sector of EC intervention at 
Solomon Islands level. The remaining support (€ 1,980,000) is allocated to a technical cooperation 
facility including support to the National Authorising Officer (NAO). Aid will be delivered mostly through 
support to projects. The B-envelope for unforeseen needs amounts to € 3,300,000. 
 
The indicative programme does not provide for budget support, but opens the possibility to reallocate 
funds to this type of support, subject to a specific decision when EuropeAid eligibility criteria are met. 
 
At Regional level 
 
At the regional level, the two main priorities under the 10th EDF 2008-2013 are detailed in the 
Regional Strategy Paper and the Regional Indicative Programme approved by the EU and the 15 ACP 
Pacific States (that include Solomon Islands, Micronesia and Kiribati): 
 
• regional economic integration - € 45 million available for development of human resources, 
key industries and trade capacity, trade arrangements and integration into the world economy. 
Regional integration is seen as a way of bringing stability and development to the Pacific 
islands. 
 
• sustainable management of natural resources and the environment - € 40 million to support 
green measures, help low-lying atolls respond to rising sea-levels, protect biodiversity and 
support fishery development. The later includes inter alia initiatives to promote greater 
regional integration of fishery management, increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
local tuna processing industries, strengthen the region capacities to fight IUU fishing, including 
                                                 
5 The eligibility criteria for budget support can be consulted at URL 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/budget-support/index_en.htm 
6 Equals € 2.2 million per year. The FPA contribution is € 0.4 million per year in total, of which € 0.12 million 
(30%) are allocated to support the implementation of the fisheries policy. 
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stock assessment and the development of the monitoring, control and surveillance strategy. 
Two projects drafted by SPC (SCICOFish & SMACFish, each worth € 10 million) focusing on 
offshore and inshore fisheries research and management development are already in a 
advanced submission state. A continuation of action currently supported under the DEVFISH 
project is also strongly considered under the form of a DEVFISH II programme. 
 
A further € 10 million from the 10th Regional EDF will be available to cover participation of non-state 
actors and technical cooperation and support for the Regional Authorising Officer (RAO) for the EDF, 
i.e. the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS). Management of regional fishery development 
projects can be delegated to the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) or the Secretariat for the Pacific 
Community (SPC).  
 
For comparison purposes, the following table shows that the nominal annual contribution paid to the 
three PICs having signed a fishing agreement with the EC equals more than € 1.4 million per year. In 
2007 and 2008, Kiribati was paid an increased contribution7 based on EC catch in excess of the 
reference tonnage (see Table 10). The specific contribution to definition and implementation of the 
National fishery policies was initially slightly less than 400,000 € per year but is now in excess of € 
500,000 per year as the percentage of the contribution for Kiribati was scheduled to increase up to 
60% from 2009 onwards.  
 
Table 4 : Summary of the main financial characteristics of fishing agreements between certain PICs and 
the EC. Source : Protocols 
 Period Annual contribution 
(€) 
% sector support Sector support 
(€) 
Kiribati 16/09/2006-15/09/2012 478 400 30%* 143 250 
FSM 26/02/2007-25/02/2010 559 000 18% 100 620 
Solomon Islands 9/10/2006-8/10/2009 400 000 30% 120 000 
Total  1 437 400  363 870 
* increased to 40% the second year and 60% the years after. 
 
The annualised EDF contribution to all 15 ACP Pacific States for sustainable management of natural 
resources and the environment is equivalent to € 6.6 million (maximum of € 40 million over 6 years) 
 
¾ Past EC intervention in cooperation for fisheries development at national and regional 
levels 
 
At Solomon Islands level, the Community could make use of part of the quite significant STABEX 98 
funds (€ 50.1 million to be used before end 2008 and disbursed before end 2010) to fund a number of 
projects with relevance to fisheries development including support to the Competent Authority for 
sanitary certification of fisheries products exported to the EU and a pilot-project to develop an export-
orientated seaweed industry. Of interest for the National fisheries sector, STABEX 98 funds have been 
use for the rehabilitation of wharves (Noro) and for implementation of aids to navigation. No fisheries 
related projects have been funded under the STABEX 99 (€ 31.9 million). 
 
At regional level, interventions of the EC have traditionally focused on management of natural 
resource, with the fisheries sector seen as one of main pillar of development. Under the 9th EDF 
(2003-3007), the following projects have been funded to support strengthening of fisheries 
management including research and control: 
 
• Pacific Regional Coastal Fisheries Development Programme (PROCFISH) under 9th EDF, 
contribution agreement signed with SPC (€ 10.2 million): focus on management of certain 
coastal fisheries and oceanic fisheries, with an extension (CoFISH, € 2 million) to cover ACP 
States not included under PROCFISH. 
• Development of Tuna fisheries in the Pacific ACP countries (DEVFISH) under 9th EDF, 
contribution agreement signed with FFA (€ 3 million in total): focus on development of locally 
                                                 
7 According to catch data available, Kiribati was to be paid approximately an additional  € 148,000 in 2007 and € 
380,000 in 2008 (rounded figures). 
Report FPA 20/SLB/09 
- Page 10 - 
based tuna industries, training to fisheries access negotiation, support to fishery policy 
development in certain Pacific countries. DEVFISH is due to finish Dec. 2009. 
• Scientific support to Oceanic Fishery Management in the WCP area (SCIFISH) under 9th EDF, 
contribution agreement signed with SPC (€ 6.5 million): focus on improvement of scientific 
advice (data collection, stock assessment) and pilot projects on control of fishing activities 
(use of modern technology, including satellite-based technology to detect IUU fishing) 
 
The Pacific Region, including Solomon Islands, will also benefit from the activities of the two large 
intra-ACP projects: Strengthening Fisheries Products Health Conditions (support to third countries to 
meet the requirements of the SPS regulations), and Strengthening Fisheries Management in ACP 
countries (ACP FISH II: improving institutional capacities for sustainable fisheries management in ACP 
countries). 
 
Under the previous EDFs, a number of other projects focusing on fisheries had been funded at 
regional level including tuna tagging, port sampling or observations at sea.  
 
1.4.2. The European Investment Bank 
 
EIB activities in the Solomon Islands were suspended after the Development Bank of Solomon Islands 
(DBSI) defaulted on its repayments. The DBSI is now under administration by the CBSI and 
repayment of the debt to the EIB remains an issue to be resolved. However, the EIB has approved a 
new € 3.5 million loan to a company in the forestry sector in a joint international- national public sector 
venture (also supported with STABEX 98 funds) [sourced from the Country Strategy Paper for 
Solomon Islands for the 2008-2013 period]. Contacted in May 2009, EIB confirmed that the situation 
was the same but was confident that an agreement could be reached before the end of the current 
year and that new operation in the country could be open within the foreseeable future. 
 
1.4.3. Other Donors 
 
Australia provides the major part of external aid to Solomon Islands. In 2006, Australia committed the 
equivalent of € 58 million mainly to support Governance and Security in the country. Japan ranked 
second in 2006 with € 15 million spent mostly on infrastructure development. Other International 
donors include the EC (€ 12 million in 2006), Taiwan (€ 8 million) and New Zealand (€ 3 million still in 
2006)  
 
 
1.5. Status of Solomon Islands concerning technical rules governing export 
of fisheries products to the EC 
 
1.5.1. Fishery Products Health Certification 
 
Up until the present, Solomon Islands have not complied with the EC fish hygiene requirements set 
out in the Regulations (EC) 853/2004, (EC) No 854/2004 and (EC) No 882/2004. However the 
Solomon Islands was one of the eight countries listed in Annex II of Commission Decision 97/296/EC 
when it was repealed, and is thus one of the countries to which a transitional derogation is applied to 
the requirement for a specific decision of the Commission as per Reg (EC) No 2076/2005 (Annex II) 
until 31 December 2009. This means that the hygiene requirements are not fully harmonised, and that 
the CA’s of importing Member States must authorise the imports on a bilateral basis, and that the 
products so imported may not enter intra-community trade. On this basis exports to the EC are 
authorised from one establishment (the tuna canning and loining owned by Soltai Fishing Ltd), one 
cold store (owned by National Fisheries Development Ltd) and four freezer vessels (National purse 
seiners owned by NFD Ltd as well). There have been no RASFF notifications since 2004. 
 
An inspection mission was undertaken by the FVO in July 2007, with a view to assessing the 
compliance with EC requirements, and the possibility of making a specific decision regarding the 
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status of Solomon Islands. The CA is the Environmental Health Division of the Ministry of Health and 
Medical Services. The mission found that legislation could be considered as equivalent, and 
knowledge of EC requirements was adequate, along with the controls applied to the production chain. 
However certification procedures were found to present irregularities, one of the freezer vessels and 
the cold store presented serious deficiencies and storage temperatures for frozen tuna were all non-
compliant. There was also a total absence of sampling and testing for hazards in fishery products and 
water supplies. An action plan of corrective actions was required and submitted to the satisfaction of 
the Commission, and DG SANCO considers now placing Solomon Islands on list I on this basis 
without sending a new FVO inspection mission. Obtaining the EC sanitary agreement was seen as a 
high priority in Solomon Islands as a condition to support the development of the National tuna 
processing industry. Note that the Competent Authority of Solomon Islands is expected to run on a 
cost-recovery basis.  
 
In 2005, EDF supported an intervention project to strengthen the Competent Authority with technical 
assistance and training (independent of the EDF Funded “Strengthening fishery product health 
conditions in ACP Countries” project). However, this project also launched an assessment and 
advisory mission to the country in late 2006, as part of a regional project, and supported participation 
in a regional workshop in Fiji, in December of that year. The findings of the mission coincide with FVO 
findings, noting that: 
 
• The attribution of powers to the different official bodies is clear. The CA is very aware of the 
EU regulation requirement and could work under an equivalent approach to food safety. The 
regulations 2005 are following the EU criteria, but some review is needed. 
• The exports that occur are well under the surveillance of the CA and registers are available to 
prove it. 
• The designated CA is completing the manuals of procedures for the inspection and auditing. 
The inspector dealing with the facilities visited showed a good level of awareness on the EU 
regulation, the national ones and the procedures in place. 
• The testing laboratory under reconstruction will need technical assistance and training to put 
the routine to work, to draft the manuals of procedures and quality control and to go through 
the accreditation process. 
• The on-land facilities treating fishery products in Noro could be considered as working under 
EU standards. 
 
At regional level, only Papua New Guinea is the only Pacific third country on the list of countries from 
which imports of fishery products is permitted. Fiji was “de-listed” by the European Commission as 
recently as May 2008, as a result of a highly negative finding of a FVO inspection mission in July 
2007. 
 
1.5.2. Catch certification in the frame of fight against IUU fishing 
 
The newly adopted Council regulation 1005/2008 foresees inter alia that as from 1st January 2010, all 
imports of fisheries products into the Community must be accompanied by a catch certificate (art. 12). 
Through this instrument, the competent authorities of the flag state country of the vessel catching the 
fish will certify that the catches concerned have been made in accordance with applicable laws, 
regulations and international conservation and management measures. This certificate shall be 
validated by a competent authority of Solomon Islands, and if necessary (art. 14), other documents 
envisaged by the certification scheme in the event of an indirect import after transit or processing of 
products caught by another flag State . 
 
The acceptance of catch certificates is conditional to the notification from Solomon Islands of public 
Authorities empowered to attest the veracity of the information contained in catch certificates and to 
carry out verifications of such certificates (art. 20). In June 2009, the notification to the Commission 
from Solomon Islands was still pending. However, overall, it can be assumed from the findings of the 
field visit that Solomon Islands will have no difficulties whatsoever to comply with the regulation. The 
designation of the Competent Authority of Solomon Islands appears straightforward as the Ministry of 
Fisheries concentrates all the functions and information flows required for validation of catch 
certificates (including VMS, licence lists) with technical backup from the Forum Fisheries Agency. In 
addition and according to representatives of the private sector, exports to the EU from Solomon 
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Islands consist in tuna loins processed domestically out of raw material caught exclusively by tuna 
fishing vessels flying the national flag. Solomon Islands do not have therefore to source catch 
certificates from other flag States that would supply the local processing industry. 
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2. INFORMATION ON TUNA FISHERIES 
 
2.1. The Tuna Fisheries in the Western Central Pacific 
 
2.1.1. Overview 
 
World catches of the three major tuna species (skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye) for all types of gears 
combined totalled over 4.1 million tonnes on average over the 2005-2007 period. The Western and 
Central Pacific area is the main fishing ground for tunas, cumulating 53% of world catches on average, 
ahead of the Indian Ocean (25%), the Eastern Pacific (14%) and the Atlantic Ocean (8%). 
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Figure 3 : Distribution of World catches of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye across all oceans for the period 
2005-2007 all types of gears aggregated. Source : FAO 
 
The provisional total WCP tuna catch for 2007 was estimated at 2,396,815 tonnes, the highest annual 
catch recorded, and more than 120,000 tonnes higher the previous record in 2006 (2,273,322 tonnes). 
During 2007, the purse seine fishery accounted for an estimated 1,739,859 tonnes (73% of the total 
catch, and a record for this fishery), with pole-and-line taking an estimated 214,935 tonnes (9%), the 
longline fishery an estimated 232,388 tonnes (10%), and the remainder (8%) taken by troll gear and a 
variety of artisanal gears, mostly in eastern Indonesia and the Philippines. The WCP tuna catch 
(2,396,815 tonnes) for 2007 represented 84% of the total Pacific Ocean catch of 2,800,740 tonnes.  
 
The following figure shows the distribution of catches per 5° square. Most of the WCP tuna fisheries 
are concentrated in the tropical area bound by 20°N and 20°S. According to FFA, the waters under 
jurisdiction of Parties to the Nauru agreement (the PNA)8 account for 80% of the catch of the 
equatorial purse-seine fleet and 30% of the bigeye longline fleet. 
 
 
                                                 
8 The current PNA members are Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu 
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Figure 4 : Distribution of catches of tunas in the WCP area by gear over the 2002-2005 period. 
 
The following section will review the two main fisheries in which European Community operators have 
some interests, namely the purse seine fishery and the longline fishery.  
 
2.1.2. The purse seine fishery 
 
¾ Fishing fleets 
 
During the mid-1980s, the purse seine fishery accounted for only 40% of the total catch in the WCP, 
but has grown in significance to a level now contributing around 73% of total tuna catch volume 
(1,740,000 tonnes in 2007, see next section). The majority of the historic WCP purse seine catch has 
come from the four main distant-water fleets (Japan, Korea, Taiwan and USA), which numbered 147 
vessels in 1995, but has gradually declined in numbers to 110 vessels in 2007. In contrast, there has 
been a steady increase in the number of vessels from Pacific Islands fleets, which totalled 66 vessels 
in 2007. The remainder includes a large number of smaller vessels in the Indonesian and Philippines 
domestic fisheries, and a variety of other domestic and foreign fleets, including several relatively 
recent distant-water entrants into the tropical fishery like China, New Zealand and Spain which has a 
record of three vessels active in the area over the last three years. The Spanish fleet accounts for 1% 
of the total purse seine feet operating in the WCP area. 
 
The next table displays the number of purse seiners operating in the WCP area by flag, and the next 
figure, the evolution of the purse seine fleets for three main groupings: distant-waters fishing nation 
fleets, domestic fleets of pacific island, domestic fleets non-Pacific islands (e.g. Philippines)   
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Table 5 : Number of purse seiners active in the WCP area by flag. Source : SPC 
Flag 2005 2006 2007 
Australia 0 3 2 
China 8 9 10 
FSM 6 3 4 
Japan 35 35 35 
Kiribati 1 1 1 
Korea 28 28 28 
Marshall 6 5 5 
New Zealand 11 11 10 
Papua New Guinea 42 40 41 
Philippines 10 11 12 
Solomon 3 4 5 
Spain 3 3 3 
Taiwan 34 34 34 
USA 15 13 13 
Vanuatu 8 7 10 
TOTAL 210 207 213 
 
 
Figure 5 : Number of purse seiners operating in the WCP area. Source : SPC 
 
It should be noted that the US purse seine fleet commenced a significant rebuilding phase in late 2007 
supported by Taiwanese investments, with vessels numbers in mid-2008 close to double that of recent 
years (25 vessels), and further increase in 2009 (close to 39 vessels).  
 
¾ Catches 
 
The provisional 2007 purse-seine catch of 1,739,859 tonnes was the highest on record, with most 
fleets catching more than in 2006, particularly the Taiwan, PNG and Marshall Islands fleets. The 2007 
purse-seine catch was dominated by a record catch of skipjack tuna (1,472,746 tonnes – 85% of the 
total catch). The purse-seine skipjack catch increased by more than 500,000 tonnes (or 59%) since 
2001, at an average of about 90,000 tonnes per year. The 2007 purse-seine catch of yellowfin tuna 
(228,426 tonnes – 13%) was lower than catches in recent years, but still higher than the average for 
the period since 2000 (~218,000 tonnes). The provisional catch estimate for bigeye tuna for 2007 
(38,324 tonnes – 2%) was the second highest on record. The following table shows the purse seine 
catches by flag over the last three year. It shows that the main distant-fishing nations (e.g. Taiwan, 
Korea, Japan) remain at the origin of a large part of the catches in the WCP area. Some Pacific 
Islands domestic fleets like Papua New Guinea principally and Vanuatu and Marshall Islands to a 
lesser extent emerge as major players. 
 
Catches by purse seiners of the European Community represent a small share of the total purse seine 
catches in the WCP area (around 1% over the 2005-2007 period).  
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Table 6 : Purse seine catches (tonnes) in the WCP by flag. Source SPC* 
Flag 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Australia   0 0 0 
China 48 672 52 757 54 949 52 126 
EPO US 4 366 4 366 4 366 4 366 
FS Micronesia 28 037 10 340 13 504 17 294 
Indonesia 181 095 204 600 206 696 197 464 
Japan 250 816 250 247 245 632 248 898 
Kiribati 7 107 4 664 5 452 5 741 
Korea 204 556 251 863 258 249 238 223 
Marshall 56 174 42 358 59 410 52 647 
New Zealand 24 162 24 682 30 564 26 469 
Papua New Guinea 219 981 208 397 219 770 216 049 
Philippines 146 211 157 254 184 684 162 716 
Solomon Isl. 16 432 22 320 17 310 18 687 
Spain 3 432 10 862 19 747 11 347 
Taiwan 195 132 210 252 232 624 212 669 
USA 86 204 68 471 72 221 75 632 
Vanuatu 74 746 60 963 67 021 67 577 
TOTAL 1 547 123 1 584 396 1 692 199 1 607 906 
* Catches data presented in this table may slightly differ from catch data used in the main 
text due to incomplete coverage at the time of publication of the SPC yearbook from which 
figures are drawn. 
 
As shown in the following figure, the Taiwan fleet had been the highest producer in the tropical purse 
seine fishery until 2004, when surpassed by the combined Pacific Islands purse seine fleets fishing 
under the FSM Arrangement9. In the past two years, the Korean and FSM Arrangement fleets have 
been the highest producers. The fleet sizes and effort by the Japanese and Korean purse seine fleets 
have been relatively stable for most of this time series. Several Taiwan vessels reflagged in Pacific 
countries in 2002, dropping the fleet from 41 to 34 vessels. The increase in annual catch by the FSM 
Arrangement fleet until 2004 corresponds to an increase in vessel numbers. Catch by FSM 
Arrangement fleet can be expected to decrease over 2008 and 2009 as some vessels registered 
under the US flag. 
 
 
Figure 6 : Evolution of the catches of the five main purse seine fleets. Source : SPC 
                                                 
9 The FSM Arrangement was developed as a mechanism for domestic vessels of the PNA to access the fishing 
resources of other parties. It came in force in 1995. Signatories are Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. The FSM Arrangement aims to: Provide access 
for Domestic Vessels to parties’ waters on terms no less favourable than those granted to distant water fishing 
nations; secure maximum sustainable economic benefits from tuna resources; promote greater participation by 
nationals of Parties in fisheries & assist in development of national fisheries industries; allow access to vessels 
on terms consistent with Palau Arrangement. 
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The estimated delivered value of the purse seine tuna catch in the WCPFC area for 2007 is USD 2.4 
billion (€ 1.7 billion) the highest level since at least 1997. This represents an increase of USD 743 
million or 43% on the estimated delivered value of the catch in 2006. This increase was driven by a 
USD 680 million (54%) increase in delivered value of the skipjack catch, which is estimated alone to 
be worth USD 1.2 million in 2007, resulting from a 9% increase in catch and a 42% increase in the 
composite delivered price. The value of the yellowfin catch also rose to around USD 393 million with a 
rise of 21 per cent in the composite price being offset by an 8 per cent decline in catch.  
 
2.1.3. The longline fishery 
¾ Fleets 
 
The longline fishery accounts for around 10–13% of the total WCP catches. The total number of 
vessels involved in the fishery has generally fluctuated between 4,000 and 5,000 for the last 30 years. 
The fishery involves two main types of operation: 
• large (typically >250 GRT) distant-water freezer vessels which undertake long voyages 
(months) and operate over large areas of the region. These vessels may target either tropical 
(yellowfin, bigeye tuna) or subtropical (albacore tuna) species.  
• smaller (typically <100 GRT) offshore vessels which are usually domestically-based, 
undertaking trips less than one month, with ice or chill capacity, and serving fresh or air-freight 
sashimi markets, or canneries specialising on albacore (white meat tuna for the US market). 
 
According to SPC data, the number of EC longliners from Spain operating for at least part of their 
fishing time in the WCP area has grown from 8 vessels in 2005 to 15 in 2007 (10 in 2006). However, 
they represent a marginal portion of the 5,000 or so longliners operating in this area. The Spanish 
vessels operate on the South Pacific distant-water swordfish fishery, which is a relatively new fishery 
distinct from the longline fisheries exploiting tropical tunas and albacore.  
 
¾ Catches 
 
The provisional WCP longline catch of target species (232,388 tonnes) for 2007 was the lowest since 
2000 and around 12% lower than the highest on record which was attained in 2004 (264,465 tonnes). 
The WCP albacore longline catch (76,151 tonnes – 33%) for 2007 was the lowest since 2000. The 
provisional bigeye catch (82,735 tonnes – 36%) for 2007 was close to the average for the period 
2000–2007, and the yellowfin catch (69,857 tonnes – 30%) was the lowest for 8 years. Swordfish 
catches, either as a result of targeted fisheries or as by-catches of tuna fisheries, totalled 23,644 
tonnes in 2007, ahead of 2006 catches (21,653 tonnes). 
 
In terms of Nationality, the fishing fleets flying flags of Taiwan, Japan and Korea cumulates more than 
half of total longline catches in the WCPO. Total catches reported by Spain vary between 3,000 (2005) 
and 6,000 tonnes (2006) all species included (inc. oceanic sharks). Catches of swordfish by Spain are 
known only for 2006 (3,100 t). Overall, catches by Spanish longliners in the WCP represent less than 
1% of total catches, and 14% of total declared swordfish catches. 
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Figure 7 : Longline catch by species in the WCP area. Source : SPC 
 
A significant change in the WCP longline fishery over the past 10 years has been the growth of Pacific 
Islands domestic albacore fishery, which has gone from taking 33% of the total south Pacific albacore 
longline catch in 1998, to accounting for over 57% of the catch in 2007. The combined national fleets 
making up the Pacific Islands domestic albacore fishery have numbered around 300 (mainly small 
“offshore”) vessels in recent years. 
 
The estimated delivered value of the longline tuna catches in the WCPFC area for 2007 is USD 1.2 
billion (€ 847 million). It rivals the much larger purse seine catch in landed value (USD 1.7 billion). This 
represents a decrease of USD 103 million on the estimated value of the catch in 2006. The value of 
the albacore catch decreased significantly by USD 78 million (35%) while the value of the bigeye catch 
increased by USD 33 million (5%) and the value of the yellowfin catch declined by USD 28 million 
(6%). The albacore catch was estimated to be worth USD 148 million in 2007 with the 35% decline 
being driven by 27% decrease in the composite price and a 10% decrease in catch. The bigeye catch 
was estimated to be worth USD 668 million with the catch declining 2% and the composite price 
increasing 7%. The estimated delivered value of the yellowfin catch was at USD 422 million as the 7% 
decline in catch more than offset the 1% rise in the composite price. 
 
2.2. Status of stocks 
 
The status of the three main stocks exploited in the WCP equatorial area is monitored by the Scientific 
Committee installed under the WCPFC. The following sections summarise the latest scientific advices 
produced by this Committee. 
 
2.2.1. Skipjack 
 
Skipjack tuna is a fast growing, short-lived species (maximum age ~3 years) that has rapid population 
turnover. It has high resilience to fishing and can support annual catches at the current level (1.7 
million tonnes). The majority of exploitation occurs on fish that have already reached reproductive 
maturity (age 1+). Most skipjack therefore have the opportunity to reproduce before they are exposed 
to intensive fishing. According to the key conclusions of the models presented in 2007, overfishing is 
not occurring and the stock is not in an overfished state. The high recent catches are considered 
to be sustainable unless recruitment falls persistently below the long-term average. The WCPFC 
Scientific Committee did not formulate any specific management recommendation. However, it is 
noted that any increases in purse-seine catches of skipjack may result in a corresponding increase in 
fishing mortality for bigeye and yellowfin tunas. 
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2.2.2. Yellowfin 
 
Yellowfin tuna has a life span of up to ~7 years of age, grows rapidly and has moderate population 
turnover. Yellowfin begins spawning at ~1.5−2 years of age (~100 cm fork length or 20 kg). The 
current catch levels are 400,000−450,000 tonnes, mainly taken in the western equatorial region of the 
WCPO by purse-seine and the domestic fisheries of Philippines and Indonesia. The purse-seine 
fishery catches juvenile yellowfin in floating-object sets (logs and fish aggregation devices, or FADs) 
and large yellowfin from free-school sets. Large catches of juvenile yellowfin are taken by the domestic 
fisheries of Philippines and Indonesia. The most recent (2007) stock assessment for yellowfin 
indicates that the stock is at least fully exploited and that there is a 50% chance that overfishing 
is occurring. The WCPFC Scientific Committee has recommended that fishing mortality be reduced. 
Most of the stock depletion is attributable to the Indonesian and Philippines domestic fisheries and the 
purse-seine fishery. The longline fishery has a relatively low impact on the yellowfin stock. 
 
2.2.3. Bigeye 
 
Bigeye tuna lives to at least 12 years of age, grows more slowly than yellowfin, has lower natural 
mortality, and a smaller stock size. Bigeye reaches a maximum size of ~120 kg, and begins spawning 
at ~3−4 years of age (~110 cm fork length or 30 kg). While the biggest component of the catch is 
larger fish caught by longline, significant exploitation of juveniles occurs in the purse-seine fishery 
setting on floating objects and in the domestic fisheries of Philippines and Indonesia. These juvenile 
catches have high impact on the subsequent adult population. Recent assessments show that 
overfishing of bigeye tuna is currently occurring. The WCPFC Scientific Committee has 
recommended that fishing mortality be reduced by a minimum of 30% from the average levels for 
2003−2006. The large stock depletion is attributable to the longline fishery and, to a lesser extent, 
fisheries that capture juvenile bigeye tuna. 
 
In summary, there are continued concern regarding the stock status of both yellowfin and bigeye tuna. 
This is not new. The WCPCF Scientific Committee has consistently recommended reductions of 
fishing mortality at least on bigeye since the creation of WCPFC especially in the equatorial region 
where both the purse seine and longline fisheries develop. 
 
2.3. Ecosystem considerations 
 
SPC carries out considerable research on the impact of fishing on the environment. The following 
summarises the most recent findings. 
 
The tuna fisheries of the WCP principally target four main tuna species: skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and 
albacore tuna. However, the method fisheries also catch a range of other species in association with 
these main species. Some of the associated species are of commercial value (by-product), while many 
others are of no value and are, consequently, discarded. There are also incidents of the capture of 
species of importance due to their ecological and/or social significance (‘protected species’), including 
marine mammals, sea turtles and some species of shark (e.g. whale sharks). 
 
Overall, catches from unassociated and associated purse-seine sets are dominated by the tuna 
species (99.9% and 98.6%, respectively) and there has been limited interaction with protected 
species. Most of the observed interactions involved unidentified species of marine mammals and few 
mortalities have been recorded. 
 
Species composition of the catch was also estimated for three main longline fisheries operating in the 
WCPO: the western tropical Pacific (WTP) shallow-setting longline fishery, the WTP deep-setting 
longline fishery, and the western south Pacific (WSP) albacore fishery. While estimates are uncertain 
due to the low level of observer coverage, some general conclusions are available. The main tuna 
species account for 46%, 72% and 72% of the total catch (by weight) of the three fisheries, 
respectively. Blue shark was the third-ranked species in the catch composition of all three fisheries. 
The WTP shallow fishery has a higher proportion of non-tuna species in the catch, principally shark 
and billfish species, while opah (moonfish) represents a significant component of the WSP albacore 
longline catch. There are also considerable differences in the species composition of the billfish catch 
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between the three fisheries, while overall the WTP shallow and WSP albacore fisheries catch a higher 
proportion of surface-orientated species compared to the WTP deep-setting fishery. 
 
Interactions with seabirds and marine mammals were very low in all three longline fisheries. Catches 
of the five species of marine turtles were observed in the equatorial longline fishery, although the 
observed encounter rate was very low and most of the turtles caught were alive at the time of release. 
 
 
2.4. Analysis of the access arrangements in the WCP and implications for 
the EC fishing fleet 
 
Access to fishing opportunities for tuna stocks in the Western and Central Pacific region is regulated 
through a series of multilateral and bilateral fisheries agreements. Within the multilateral framework, 
the principal mechanisms are the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, which has 
overarching responsibility for tuna management in the region, and the Palau Arrangement, which 
establishes a scheme for allocating purse seine fishing opportunities in the waters under the 
jurisdiction of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (a sub-regional grouping possessing waters in which 
most purse seine fishing takes place). In order to fully understand the regional management 
framework, however, a brief overview of all of the arrangements must be provided. 
 
2.4.1. Multilateral Framework 
 
There are several relevant international agreements, arrangements and schemes applicable to the 
international tuna fisheries in the Central and Western Pacific, although these largely fall into three 
main frameworks: 
 
• the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), a regional fisheries 
management organization open to both coastal States and distant water fishing nations 
(DWFNs); 
• the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), a regional body open only to coastal States; and 
• the Nauru Agreement, a sub-regional agreement involving 8 Pacific island States.  
 
¾ Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
 
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission was established under an international 
convention10 which entered into force on 19 June 2004. The Commission currently has 25 members,11 
including the EC and several other DWFNs. In addition, 7 territories are recognized as participating 
territories12 and five countries as cooperating non-members.13 The general objective of the 
Convention/Commission is to ensure, through effective management, the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the western and central Pacific Ocean. The 
Commission has competence with respect to all species of highly migratory fish stocks (except 
sauries) throughout the Central and Western Pacific region and has responsibility for adopting 
conservation and management measures applicable throughout the range of the stocks (although, as 
is usual, it does not have powers to adopt specific regulatory measures applicable in waters under 
national jurisdiction without the consent of the coastal State). Its main functions include: 
 
                                                 
10 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean, opened for signature in September 2000. 
11 Australia, China, Canada, Cook Islands, European Community, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, 
Japan, Kiribati, Korea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, Vanuatu. 
12 American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, 
Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna. 
13 Belize, Indonesia, Senegal, Mexico, El Salvador. 
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• adopting conservation and management measures and recommendations, including setting 
the total allowable catch and level of fishing effort for specific stocks; 
• allocating the total allowable catch or the total level of fishing effort amongst members; 
• establishing mechanisms for monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement (including 
VMS). 
 
Although a relatively new organisation, the Commission is to a large extent the central decision-
making body in the region – in particular as decisions about the total level of fishing effort and catches 
are adopted within the Commission (although the Commission has yet to set TACs for specific stocks). 
In practice, however, the Commission also adopts measures which are fed in or established under 
other processes such as the Nauru Agreement and related Arrangements. 
 
¾ Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) 
 
The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was established in 1979 under an international convention signed 
by 12 members of the South Pacific Forum, and now has 17 members14 (all of which are also 
members of WCPFC). Membership of FFA is open only to Pacific Island coastal States and territories, 
and the objective of the Agency is to coordinate and administer regional fisheries policies and 
management, in particular with a view to presenting a common front to DWFNs seeking access to the 
tuna resources in the region. The main functions of the Agency, as defined in the FFA Convention, 
include: 
 
• providing advice, information and assistance in the development of fisheries policies and 
negotiations, and assistance in the issue of licences, collection of fees or in matters pertaining 
to surveillance and enforcement; 
• collecting and analysing relevant statistical and biological information; 
• collecting and disseminating information concerning management procedures, legislation and 
agreements. 
 
In practice, the FFA plays a central role in the coordination of Pacific island fisheries policies and 
provides central administrative / secretariat functions for several of the multilateral treaties and 
agreements, including the US treaty and the Nauru Agreement (and related arrangements). FFA also 
coordinates the regional register of foreign fishing vessels and the regional VMS scheme. 
 
¾ Niue Treaty 
 
The Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement was adopted in 1993 
and all FFA Members, except Tokelau, are parties. The agreement is, legally, a stand-alone 
agreement although it was adopted directly in response to Article 5 of the FFA Convention (calling for 
the promotion of intra-regional coordination and cooperation in fisheries surveillance and law 
enforcement) and the FFA has certain administrative responsibilities under the Treaty and so, in 
practice, taking account also of the largely concurrent membership, the Treaty can be seen as a de 
facto subsidiary agreement of FFA. 
 
The Treaty is an agreement on cooperation between FFA members on monitoring, control and 
surveillance of fishing, and includes provisions on exchange of information and procedures for 
cooperation in monitoring, prosecuting and penalising illegal fishing vessels. It is designed to 
complement the other management frameworks in the region, and specifically defines its relationship 
to harmonized minimum terms and conditions of access. Despite initial broad political support for the 
Treaty, there has to date been minimal implementation of it. In recent years, however, there has been 
renewed interest resulting in the organisation and implementation of joint deployment plans. 
Consideration is currently being given to a subsidiary, or supplementary, agreement, possibly to 
                                                 
14  Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
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include the United States and France (on behalf of its territories in the South Pacific), both of which 
participate in regional multilateral enforcement actions15. 
 
¾ Nauru Agreement (NA) 
 
The Nauru Agreement was adopted in February 1982, and now has eight parties – the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon 
Islands and Tuvalu (usually referred to collectively as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement or PNA). 
The central objective of the agreement is to coordinate and harmonize the management of fisheries 
with regard to common stocks within the Parties’ fisheries zones, in particular with regard to the 
access of foreign fishing vessels. The types of cooperation envisaged by the agreement include 
establishing principles for the granting of priority to domestic fishing vessels; and establishing uniform 
(minimum) terms and conditions for foreign fisheries access, including in relation to licensing, use of 
observers, reporting, vessel marking, etc. 
 
The Nauru agreement is a framework, containing objectives rather than specific provisions on access, 
but has been implemented by three Implementing Arrangements (1982, 1990 and 2008) which set out 
the detailed Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access to the Parties fisheries zones and by two 
supplementary arrangements on purse seine fishing (the Palau Arrangement and the FSM 
Arrangement). 
 
Implementing Arrangements – Harmonized Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access 
 
The Nauru Agreement has been supplemented by three Implementing Arrangements, which apply 
cumulatively, setting out Harmonized Minimum Terms and Conditions (MTCs) of Access. The MTCs 
contained in the Implementing Arrangements are considered within the region to be the most 
important of the various arrangements. The terms and conditions include the requirement of foreign 
fishing vessel to be registered and in “good standing” both in the Regional Register of Vessels and the 
FFA VMS register, a ban on transhipment at sea, reporting requirements, etc.  
 
The MTCs are generally concerned with the conditions that apply once access has been granted, 
rather than the question of access itself. However, the third Implementing Arrangement (adopted in 
2008 and applicable to any future EU fisheries agreements) contains a restriction on access to certain 
high seas areas (applicable from 1 January 2010). Thus, Article I(3) of the Arrangement provides that 
a foreign fishing vessel must not fish, during the period of validity of a licence issued by a PNA: (a) in 
the area of high seas bounded by the national waters of the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Indonesia, Palau and Papua New Guinea (the high seas area to the west of the PNA area); or (b) the 
area of high seas bounded by the national waters of the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu (the high seas “enclave” in 
the centre of the PNA area). The following map shows the two high seas pockets subject to 
prohibition. 
 
                                                 
15 France is involved in these joint operations through a cooperation memorandum signed with New Zealand and 
Australia on fight against IUU fishing in the South Pacific region. 
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Figure 8 : High-Seas pockets considered for seasonal closure to the purse seine fishery. Yellow: EEZ of the 
Parties to the Nauru Agreement. Source: WCPFC 
 
The majority of the MTCs have been built into the fisheries legislation of FFA members and form part 
of the licensing conditions for foreign fishing vessels under bilateral arrangements. In the case of the 
Solomon Islands, the MTCs have not been incorporated directly in legislation but s. 16(10) of the 1998 
Fisheries Act does require the Director, in issuing licences, to take account of bilateral or multilateral 
treaties relating to fisheries. As the MTCs can be included in bilateral agreements, there is little legal 
significance in the absence of any reference in domestic legislation (but a practical one in that 
inclusion of the MTCs in the domestic fisheries legislation removes the need to negotiate them during 
the development of a fishing access agreement between the two Parties, and ensures that they will be 
included uniformly in each agreement). 
 
Palau Arrangement 
 
The objective of the Palau Arrangement is to manage the purse seine fishery within the PNA region 
through a system for allocating fishing opportunities to coastal States and DWFNs. A key objective for 
the PNA when concluding the Arrangement was to enable the gradual reduction of foreign vessel 
fishing and shift towards the domestic or locally-based (foreign vessel) fleet.16  
 
The Arrangement applies to the “Purse Seine Fisheries Management Area”, defined as the exclusive 
economic or fisheries zones of the Parties and the adjacent high seas areas in the Western Pacific 
within which purse seine vessels operate, and to any species of tuna and tuna-like species taken by 
purse seine vessels (within the Management Area). The Arrangement provides an institutional 
structure for managing allocation/licensing decisions and a set of criteria for allocating licences. In 
essence, licences are allocated in the following order of priority:  
 
a) a Party’s domestic vessels;  
b) domestic vessels of another Party to the Arrangement, or vessels operated jointly by PNA;  
                                                 
16 The rationale was that as the number of vessels for each DWFN fleet reduced, this would stimulate an increase 
in access fees paid to FFA members and at the same time would encourage the foreign vessels, particularly the 
displaced vessels, to base locally in FFA members thus increasing the economic benefits. 
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c) locally-based foreign vessels;  
d) foreign fishing vessels with established access arrangements over previous years and with 
good records of compliance with national laws and regulations, the minimum terms and 
conditions and reporting requirements of the Parties; and  
e) new foreign fishing entrants to the fishery.  
 
For the purpose of (c), a “locally-based foreign fishing vessel” is defined as a foreign fishing vessel 
which is based in a Party to the Arrangement, lands all of its catch in that Party and/or operates under 
a joint venture arrangement in the territory of that Party or under arrangements whereby the operator 
of the vessel is participating in shore-based developments or is otherwise making a substantial 
contribution to the development of the domestic tuna industry of the licensing Party.  
 
Until recently, the manner in which fishing effort was managed under the Palau Arrangement was to 
set a maximum limit on the number of vessels to be licensed (the limit was 205 vessels, see below) 
and to allocate licences to individual flag States as per the following table. This system has now been 
replaced by the Vessel Day Scheme, however. 
 
Table 7 : Maximum purse seine licence numbers as per previous version of the Palau 
Arrangement (now superseded by the vessel days scheme). Source: FFA 
Category Number (agreed May 2007)* 
  
1- Multilateral Access  
US Treaty 40 
  
2- Bilateral Foreign Access  
Japan 35 
Taiwan 33 
South Korea 27 
Philippines 10 
China 4 
European Union 4 
Subtotal 1+2 153 
  
3- Domestic / Locally-Based  
All parties 52 
  
TOTAL 205 
* Not including special arrangements: EC vessels part time in Kiribati 
waters only (+2), Domestic/Locally-based (+15), China (+6), South Korea 
(+1), Philippines (+2) and Taiwan (+1). These arrangements remain in 
force as long as the number of US vessels is below its maximum 
allocation of 40 vessels. 
 
FSM Arrangement 
 
The final instrument in the Nauru framework is the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for 
Regional Fisheries Access, which was signed in November 1994 and came into force in September 
1995. All PNA are parties to the FSM Arrangement, except Kiribati and Tuvalu. The Arrangement was 
developed as a mechanism for domestic fishing vessels of the PNA to access the fishing resources of 
the other Parties and aims to provide access for domestic vessels to Parties’ waters on terms no less 
favourable than those granted to DWFNs (and on terms consistent with the Palau Arrangement). 
Domestic vessels include vessels flying the flags of the parties, but also other non-parties sponsored 
flags that can demonstrate a high contribution to Parties economy. As an example, most Vanuatu 
purse seiners are beneficiary of the FSM Arrangement as they unload most of their catch in Papua 
New Guinea. 
 
Technically, the Arrangement establishes a regional register of eligible fishing vessels, through which 
access is licensed, and contains provision on exchange of information, distribution of payments and 
cooperation in enforcement. To qualify on this register, a vessel has to have a good record of 
compliance and demonstrate large interactions with the parties shore-industries. As with the other 
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components of the Nauru Agreement, the FSM Arrangement is administered by FFA. FFA audits the 
qualification criteria of the vessels sponsored by the parties and collect licence fees. Currently, a 
vessel has to pay the equivalent of 5% of the value of its catch to be granted access to all EEZ of the 
parties to the FSM Arrangement. Licence fees collected are distributed to parties by FFA pro rata 
catches in each EEZ. 
 
2.4.2. Palau Arrangement Vessel Day Scheme 
 
The Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) became fully operational on 1 December 2007 and is the mechanism 
by which fishing effort is managed within waters under the national jurisdiction of Palau Arrangement 
Parties. It applies to fishing in the area bounded between 20°N and 20°S and the eastern boundary of 
the WCPFC Convention Area. For Palau parties, the VDS implements applicable provisions of the 
Conservation and Management Measures (CMMs) adopted by the WCPFC for the region (in particular 
CMM-2008-01 and, previously, CMM-2005-01). The Scheme replaces the previous licence allocation 
scheme (based on the number of fishing vessels). 
 
The Arrangement operates by establishing an overall limit on the number of days17 that can be fished 
by purse seine vessels operating in the EEZs of the Parties to the Palau Arrangement. The limit is 
based on the historical level of days fished in the EEZs of parties based on data provided by the 
Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). The VDS 
Management Scheme comprises three-year Management Periods and single Management Years, a 
calendar year. At the commencement of the Scheme (on 1 January 2008) a Total Allowable Effort 
(TAE) was set for the first Management Period (Table 8 overleaf), covering each of the first three 
Management Years. The initial TAE reflects the WCPCF recommendation of ensuring the purse seine 
fishing effort does not exceed 2001-2004 or 2004 level. Until WCPCF adopts another objective to 
adjust fishing effort for conservation purpose, the annual TAE will remain identical. 
 
MP1 YR1 YR2 YR3
MP2 YR4 YR5 YR6
MP3 YR7 YR8 YR9
 
Figure 9 : Management Period (MP) and Management Year (MY) of the Vessel Days Scheme as agreed in 
May 2009.  Source : FFA 
 
A fundamental difference between the VDS Management Scheme and the previous licensing scheme 
is that the TAE is allocated to the Palau Parties, rather than directly allocating opportunities to the 
DWFN vessels. Two criteria are use to allocate the TAE amongst the Parties - an equal weighting 
between the historic level of effort in zone and the level of estimated biomass in each zone each year. 
This approach recognises that while the historical level of effort is an important determining factor, 
account needs to be taken of the potential productivity of EEZs, particularly where some Palau Parties 
may have restricted effort in their EEZs for reasons such as to encourage the operation of domestic 
purse seine operations, or where there is a more cautious approach to licensing.  
 
Once allocated the Parties are free to utilise their allocated days as they see fit. In principle, this 
provides the flexibility to provide for new entrants that may offer higher fees than the existing fleets 
and for Parties to give preference to their domestic fleets should they wish to do so (although, strictly, 
account should still be taken of the general order of properties set out in the Palau Arrangement, as 
described above). Parties are under an obligation to ensure that their total number of fishing days 
                                                 
17 For the purpose of the VDS, a fishing day is any calendar day, or part thereof, during which a purse seine 
vessel is in the waters of a Party outside a port (i.e. whether searching, catching, taking or harvesting fish). A 
special provision excludes counting days transiting through Party’s waters, subject to specific conditions (fishing 
gear completely stowed). 
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does not exceed their annual allocation of fishing days but in general Parties have a wide discretion as 
to how to employ allocated fishing days, including discretion as to which purse seine vessels are 
licensed to undertake fishing activities. 
 
Vessels operating under the US Treaty and domestic vessels (operating in the waters of the home 
licensing Party) licensed under the FSM Arrangement are not subject to the VDS Management 
Scheme, although they are included in the vessel day / effort calculations. Thus, the TAE is calculated 
for all vessels and then an adjusted TAE for the Palau Parties is calculated by deducting a pool of 
vessel days based on historical effort (seven year averages, 1998-2004) to take account of US Treaty 
and FSM Arrangement vessels. The adjusted TAE is then allocated amongst the Palau Parties. 
 
To date, the Parties have agreed to be bound by 2004 effort levels as per WCPFC recommendation, 
which has resulted in the following vessel day calculations: 
 
Table 8 : Allocation of Total Allowable Effort (TAE) between PNA for the first Management period 
starting Jan. 2008. Source: FFA 
Total Allowable Effort (TAE) Vessel Days 
 
PNA TAE (2004 levels) (all fleets) 
 
 
33 856 
Deductions US Treaty (3 362 days) and FSMA (2 025 days) (5 387) 
Adjusted PNA TAE (2004 level) 28 469 
 
Allocation criteria Party Allowable Effort (PAE) 
EFFORT (%) 
7 yr average 99-
05 
BIOMASS (%) 
10 yr average 
95-04 
AVERAGE (%) 
50/50 weighting 
Vessel Days 
FSM 24.52 19.41 21.96 6 253 
Kiribati 16.44 27.07 21.76 6 194 
Marshall Islands 4.31 14.85 9.58 2 727 
Nauru 7.81 2.39 5.10 1 452 
Papua New Guinea 40.17 15.38 27.78 7 907 
Palau 0.27 3.91 2.09 595 
Solomon Islands 5.34 11.25 8.29 2 361 
Tuvalu 1.14 5.74 3.44 979 
 
 
The VDS Management Scheme provides the Palau Parties with flexibility to carry over unused fishing 
days to future years, to borrow fishing days from future years and to transfer fishing days between 
themselves on whatever terms they mutually agree. With respect to transfers between Parties, any 
two Parties may agree to transfer between themselves all or part of their PAE for a Management Year. 
With respect to transfers between Management Years and Periods, a Party may adjust its PAE for any 
Management Year within a Management Period by transferring to that year all of part of its PAE from 
another year in the same Management Period. Any unused balances can be rolled into future 
Management Periods up to a maximum of 30% of the PAE from the final Management year of the 
preceding management period.  
 
The VDS Scheme provides a mechanism to take account of size variations of purse seine vessels. 
Based on an assessment, undertaken prior to the adoption of the VDS, of vessel sizes and catch rates 
vessel days are calculated on the following basis:  
 
• for small vessels of less than 50 metres in length, a day of fishing is counted as half a day; 
• for vessels greater than 80 metres in length, a day of fishing is counted as one and a half 
days; 
• for vessels in the 50 to 80 metre range a day is equal to a day 
 
[Note: all EC purse seiners currently operating in the WCP area are greater than 80 m, so one day 
fishing is counted one and half days] 
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Finally, to secure its effective implementation and administration, the VDS system includes certain 
registration requirements (including a requirement to have good standing in the FFA regional register), 
requires payment of an administration fee and imposes certain monitoring requirements (including 
participation in the FFA VMS scheme). 
 
The VDS is administered by FFA. VMS information is used to count the number of fishing days in each 
EEZ and to monitor the actual use of fishing days of the parties against their respective initial 
allocations. 
 
An Update on the VDS 
 
The Vessel Days Scheme started officially in December 2007. The scheme is in its infancy and will 
undoubtedly require refinement to introduce mechanisms to balance recent levels of fishing effort with 
the number of vessel days allocated to individual PNA members. 
 
There is no publicly available review of the VDS after almost two years of implementation. Exchange 
of information between PNA countries appear also to be minimal. Some country would have reportedly 
already sold more fishing days than they have. The VDS is also subject to criticisms from PNA 
countries. The first is that effort from the US fleet operating under the US Treaty is not properly taken 
into account. The second is that it proves difficult if not impossible to negotiate access to the EEZ for 
foreign fleet on the basis of a monetary value of a fishing day, although auctioning days was one of 
the objectives of the scheme. Finally the major criticism is that the VDS provides discrete fishing effort 
allocation in particular EEZ although the resource is highly migratory with its annual distribution driven 
by environmental conditions. For example, under a strong El Niño, the tuna resource may concentrate 
in the waters around Kiribati and be scarce in the waters of FSM. Kiribati would have therefore to 
negotiate additional days from FSM to accommodate the access requests from the purse seine fleet. 
FSM would not provide the days for free. 
 
To have a better management of the VDS, but also to strengthen coordination of policies aiming at 
getting more value from the fish caught in their EEZ, the PNA countries have recently agreed to create 
a PNA secretariat separate from FFA. It is the intention of the PNA secretariat to pool the PNA fishing 
days into one common basket and to set a mechanism for redistribution of access fees. The PNA 
secretariat will be based in Marshall Islands and will be funded by contributions from its Member 
States and by receipts from the VDS and FSM arrangement. The PNA secretariat intends to remain 
independent and will not accept financial support from third party foreign interests. 
 
2.4.3. WCPFC Conservation and Management Measures 
 
In principle, WCPFC sits at the top of the management framework as it is the only body that accepts 
coastal States and DWFNs, it has competence with respect to all highly migratory species throughout 
the region and that competence applies to such species throughout their range. As might be expected 
from a relatively new organisation, however, measures adopted by WCPFC have been somewhat 
limited (at least when compared to the most progressive RFMOs), dealing primarily with the setting of 
overall effort targets but not usually including specific TACs or quota allocations. Furthermore, as with 
all tuna management organisations, the functions and powers of WCPFC are without prejudice to the 
sovereign rights of coastal States to manage fisheries within their waters. Therefore, measures dealing 
with access questions and licensing and allocation procedures in national waters and allocation 
methods are left primarily to the coastal State mechanisms, such as the Nauru Agreement. In general, 
WCPFC seeks to adopt the EEZ measures developed within these mechanisms within its own 
framework, and to adopt or develop compatible and equivalent measures for the high seas. 
 
The principal measure in place currently is Conservation and Management Measures 2008-01 (CMM-
2008-01), which sets out measures for bigeye and yellowfin fishing by purse seines and longlines and 
came formally into effect on 10 February 2009. For purse seine fishing, CMM-2008-1 sets an overall 
objective of a 30% reduction in bigeye mortality and a reduction in the risk of overfishing of yellowfin 
tuna and then sets out a range of measures by which these targets are to be achieved, including effort 
limitations, area closures, FAD restrictions, etc. These measures apply primarily to the high seas, with 
measures for EEZs being aligned with the Nauru Agreement MTCs and the Palau Arrangement VDS. 
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Further details in relation to CMM-2008-01 and other effort/catch related measures adopted by the 
Commission are summarised, along with their implications for the EU, in the next section.  
 
It is important to appreciate how WCPFC management measures apply to individual members and the 
distribution of fishing opportunities between high seas fishing and fishing within EEZs. Specifically, 
fishing opportunities taking place within the EEZ, whether by foreign vessels or domestic vessels, are 
fishing opportunities allocated to, or reserved for, the coastal State. Any fishing which takes place in 
the waters of a Pacific Island coastal State are in exercise of that coastal State’s fishing 
allocation/rights. Thus, within the WCFPC, the EU is a high seas fishing Member and as such its 
obligations to meet any effort reduction or limitation measures are confined to its high seas operations. 
Within EEZs, while overall the coastal State may be subject to effort reduction / limitation targets or 
requirements, that does not imply in principle that every foreign fishing fleet fishing in that country’s 
waters must implement an equivalent reduction or limitation – it is within the sovereign rights of the 
coastal State to determine how its allocation is used, for example, by increasing the opportunities 
available to one fleet at the expense of others. 
 
2.4.4. Implications for the EU Fleet 
 
It can be noted that there are very few specific fishing opportunity definitions (i.e. quotas) in the 
applicable measures, the major exception to this being the TAEs / PAEs under the Palau 
Arrangement. As far as WCPFC is concerned, however, effort restrictions are defined more generally 
in terms of overall targets or restrictions to current or recent fishing activity. 
 
¾ High Seas Fishing Opportunities 
 
High seas fishing opportunities are those determined by the WCPFC Conservation and Management 
measures. These are of course subject to potential renegotiation and change, in particular at each 
annual meeting, and some provisions apply specifically to 2009 only, and so future opportunities may 
vary. In qualitative terms, the measures are generally expressed in terms of overall fishing effort or 
vessel numbers. There are no TACs and, in general, no quota allocations (although a specific quota 
for the EC is noted in CMM-2008-05 for swordfish South of 20°S). In quantitative terms, the measures 
typically specify that fishing effort is not to be increased beyond the current level, the recent average 
or beyond the maximum amount achieved in recent years. In some cases, Members are presented 
with the option to choose between different reference points. This results in specific effort limitations of 
103 vessel days for the purse seine fishery and 2,000 tonnes per year in the longline fishery. The 103 
vessels days allocated to the EC are roughly equivalent to 1/3 of a total fishing year of one single 
purse seiner. This represents a considerable reduction (-58%) from effort deployed in 2007 (245 
fishing days). A summary of the current measures is as follows: 
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Table 9 : Summary of the main management and conservation measures having an impact on the EC 
fishing fleet active in the WCPCF area 
Bigeye and Yellowfin 
Fishery CMM Effort limit Summary of other conditions 
Purse seine 2008-
01 
 effort in days fished not to exceed 2004 levels 
or the average of 2001-2004 
 for EU = 103 vessel days in the high seas 
(2004 figure, according to CMM-2008-01; 
2001-2004 average estimated at 73 vessel 
days) 
 No consequential increase in effort in adjacent 
areas 
 Seasonal restriction on the use of FADs (1st 
August 30 September), and requirement to 
use FAD management plans 
 Requirement to retain observer from Regional 
Observer Programme during FAD closure 
period, and 20% coverage rate outside FAD 
closure 
 Full catch retention rules. 
From 2010: 
 Possible no fishing in high seas areas with the 
PNA area (high sea pockets see Figure 8), to 
be determined end 2009 
 FAD measures extended (1st July 30 
September). 
 High Seas VDS to be considered. 
 Full (100%) observer coverage 
 
Longline 2008-
01 
 Phased reduction in bigeye catches from 2004 
or the 2001-2004 average (10% reduction in 
2009; 20% in 2010; 30% in 2011) 
 exception for Members catching less than 
2000 tonnes during this period (for which 
catch limit is 2000 tonnes pa) 
 for EU 2001-2004 average = 164 tonnes; EU 
catch can be increased to 2 000 tonnes pa 
 No other specific measures mentioned. 
 
Other fish stocks 
Fishery CMM Effort limit Summary of other conditions 
southern albacore, south of 
20oS 
2005-
02 
 Option to choose highest level from 
number of fishing vessels in: (a) 2000-
2004 average or (b) 2005 level. 
 None specified. 
northern albacore 2005-
03 
 No increase from “current levels” (not 
specified in terms of days/vessels) 
 Various reporting requirements, 
including vessel-days fished 
striped marlin, south of 15oS 2006-
04 
 Option to choose highest number of 
fishing vessels in any one year from 
2000-2004 
 Requirement to report number of 
vessels 
sharks 2008-
06 
 No effort limitations specified  Requirements concerning fin quantities 
and utilisation of catches 
swordfish, south of 20oS 2008-
05 
 3 107 tonnes for 2009 (specific limit 
agreed for EU) 
 Various reporting requirements 
swordfish, north of 20oN 2008-
05 
 No increase from the current level of 
fishing effort (not specified in terms 
of days/vessels)  
 As above 
 
CMM 2006-01, now superseded by CMM 2008-01, already constrained fishing effort by stating that 
« Beginning in 2007, CCMs shall take necessary measures to ensure that the level of purse seine 
fishing effort by their vessels in areas of the high seas does not exceed 2004 levels or the average of 
2001-2004.”  
 
¾ Fishing Opportunities under Bilateral Agreements 
 
Access to the waters of the Solomon Islands, and any other PNA, is subject to the terms and 
conditions in the Nauru Agreement Implementing Arrangements and the Palau Arrangement. As noted 
above, any effort limitation measures agreed through WCPFC do not need to be of concern because 
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they are applicable to the coastal State but within that framework the coastal State can allocate fishing 
opportunities – within the Palau Arrangement rules for purse seine fishing – as it wishes.  
 
The regulation of fishing opportunities under bilateral agreements therefore fall into two categories. For 
purse seine vessels, the Palau Arrangement VDS applies; for other fishing opportunities, the coastal 
State may allocate fishing opportunities largely on its own terms. 
 
Purse seine fishing 
 
In qualitative terms, fishing opportunities for purse seine vessels are in principle only available in terms 
of vessel fishing days (at least in relation to PNA countries, including Solomon Islands). Any allocation 
to EU vessels must come from within the coastal State’s PAE – in the case of the Solomon Islands, 
this is 2,361 fishing days. Within the PAE, the EU fleet is in effect in competition with other fleets 
(except, in principle, the US fleet and other coastal State fleets, as allocations for these fleets were 
deducted prior to setting PAEs under the VDS). Quantitatively, the EU has to date been allocated 
rather limited fishing opportunities (previously in terms of number of vessels authorized (4)-, now as 
vessel days (103)). The reason for this is partly political, but also partly derives from the order of 
allocation priorities specified in the Palau Arrangement (as described above). Thus, in relation to (at 
least most) other DWFNs, the EU is at a disadvantage under the Palau Arrangement because under 
the allocation criteria, the EU is likely to fall into category (e) as a new entrant (i.e. last in order of 
priority), or best under category (d) (see page 23)18. Over time and as a result of careful negotiation, 
the EU might be able to advance its position, and therefore opportunities. It is possible that the VDS 
will make this easier, as there is greater scope for trading of vessel days.   On the other hand, there is 
always the possibility it will remain secondary to more established foreign fishing fleets. There are no 
straightforward solutions to this impediment. Options might include, however: 
 
(1) Seek to take advantage of “transfer opportunities”. As noted above, the VDS presents new 
opportunities to transfer PAEs (or parts thereof) between Parties. This may present opportunities, with 
the framework of an agreement with the Solomon Islands, to obtain vessel days allocated to another 
PNA under the condition however that the other PNA have some days allocation left aside. 
(2) Enter into a bilateral agreement which includes the provision of “locally-based foreign fishing 
vessels” (as defined in the Palau Arrangement – see above). As such vessels are treated with a higher 
level of priority than both new entrants and other foreign fishing vessels, this should in principle be a 
means to gain fishing opportunities, although of course the incentives for EU vessels are reduced. (It 
might also be recalled that the transfer of foreign vessels to locally-based foreign vessels was one of 
the initial objectives of the Palau Arrangement). 
(3) Negotiating a multilateral treaty, such as the US Treaty, under which the EU was removed from the 
VDS. Although this would not give rise to any right for a greater allocation (and there are still legal and 
political impediments to new entrant rights, such as the lack of defined allocation criteria within 
WCPFC and the capacity of existing fishing fleets), it may facilitate obtaining a larger share. However, 
there is a strong consensus amongst PNA country that the US Treaty should incorporate days 
allocation at least for conservation purpose to conform with WCPCF recommendations. It is therefore 
unlikely that they would accept a new form of multilateral Treaty that provides unlimited number of 
fishing days. 
(4) Negotiating a multilateral treaty with all parties to the Nauru Agreement for the EU fleet to be able 
to pool fishing days across the EEZ of the parties. This strategy may be underpinned by the 
forthcoming creation of a PNA secretariat whose objective is precisely to pool the fishing days 
allocation of the parties. 
 
Longline fishing 
 
The negotiation of fishing opportunities for longline fishing in principle has more flexibility than for 
purse seine fishing. In qualitative terms, the Solomon Islands and the EU could in principle negotiate 
fishing opportunities on any basis, although in practice this would almost inevitably be in terms of 
vessel numbers (given that there is no TAC to allocate and no VDS). In quantitative terms, the general 
limitations of WCPFC measures apply (but again, in terms of fishing opportunities in waters under the 
Solomon Islands’ jurisdiction, these limitations apply to the Solomon Islands rather than the EU). 
                                                 
18 There is no official classification of flag’s status under the Palau Arrangement orders of priority. 
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Within the opportunities available for the Solomon Islands to allocate, the EU fleet will again be in 
competition with other fleets. In legal terms, at least, there is no order of priority for allocations, as 
there is under the Palau Arrangement.   
 
 
2.4.5. The Eastern Pacific Fishery: Status and Management issues 
 
Since the EC tuna fleet share fishing effort between the WCP area and the Eastern Pacific Ocean 
(EPO) under the management of another RFMO (the IATTC), management and conservation rules 
adopted in the EPO bear consequences on the fishing strategy of the EC fleet. This section is 
intended to briefly review the main issues at stake in the EPO area and the likely consequences on the 
fishing possibilities available to the EC tuna fleet. 
 
The most recent evaluation of yellowfin and bigeye populations indicates a yellowfin stock in a state of 
full exploitation and a bigeye stock exploited outside safe limits. At present, the whole purse seine fleet 
active in the EPO is well above the recommended fishing capacity19. Purse seine capacity limit 
applying to the EC is equivalent to 4 purse seiners. Incidentally, it is those same 4 EC tuna purse 
seiners that fish in the WCP area. 
 
The main management tool in force in the EPO is a seasonal closure of the purse seine fishery. In 
2007, the closure lasted approximately 1.5 month during the second half of the year. Given the need 
to further reduce the catches, the scientific committee recommended in 2008 an extension of the 
seasonal closure to 12 weeks (approx. 2.5 months) for the entire EPO with an additional closure of an 
offshore area located East of Galapagos for a period of approx. 3.5 months. During the 79th meeting of 
IATTC in 2008, the parties could not reach consensus and as a consequence, no management 
measures have been adopted for 2008. At the 80th meeting of the Commission held in June 2009, 
IATTC staff tabled the same recommendation and the parties could finally agree on a 59 day closure 
in 2009, increased to 62 days in 2010 and 73 days in 2010. As concerns the closure of the offshore 
area off Galapagos, the parties could only agree on a 1 month moratorium, as opposed to the 109 
days proposed by IATTC. According to IATTC, these measures will nonetheless lead to reduce fishing 
effort by 20% over the next three year. 
 
Additionally, IATTC regulates purse seining on tuna associated with dolphins to set incidental dolphin 
mortalities in the tuna purse-seine fishery in the Agreement Area to levels approaching zero, through 
the setting of annual limits. Association of tuna schools with dolphins is fairly frequent in the EPO 
unlike in the other oceanic regions. Furthermore, IATTC imposes full retention of catch (no discards) 
and 100% observer coverage of the larger purse seiners (includes all the EC purse seiners) 
predominantly to monitor incidental catch of dolphins but also to collect scientific data and to monitor 
compliance with IATTC management and conservation measures. 
 
These recent evolutions of the IATTC management framework tend to confirm that the fishing 
possibilities available to the EU purse seine fleet in the EPO area are bound to decrease substantially 
in the forthcoming year, although at a slower pace than proposed by the IATTC staff. 
 
2.5. Focus on activities of EC fishing vessels in the WCP area 
 
At present, the European Community has three ongoing Fisheries Partnership Agreements in the 
WCP area, namely with Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia and Solomon Islands. These three 
partner countries are part of the eight parties to the Palau Arrangement. The following map shows the 
EEZ covered by these three FPAs. Beside these three FPAs, the Spanish purse seine shipowner 
association has reportedly concluded a private agreement to secure access for its purse seine fleet to 
                                                 
19 In May 2008, the carrying capacity of the purse seine fleet in the EPO was 228,246 m3. While Resolution C-
02-03 on the limitation of fishing capacity has limited entry to the fishery, there is still some room for some 
additional vessels to enter the fishery within the limits of the Resolution. The IATTC staff recommends that the 
Commission examines means to reduce the fleet size toward the Commission target of 158,000 m3 (-30%). 
Meanwhile, the main management tool used to limit fishing mortality is seasonal closure. 
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the EEZ of Tuvalu and to the EEZ of Nauru20, two other PNA country. Cumulatively, the EC purse 
seine fleet can access the EEZ of a subset of 5 countries of the 8 PNA group. 
 
Solomon Islands
2006-2009
Kiribati
2006-2012
FSM
2007-2010
 
Figure 10 : Existing fisheries partnership agreements in force as of mid-2009 between Pacific countries 
and the EC 
 
All these three agreements include fishing possibilities only for purse seiners and surface longliners. 
 
2.5.1. Purse seiners 
 
As outlined in the previous sections, the EC purse seine fleet is a minor operator in the WCP area. 
With only three vessels active and catches below 20,000 tons per year, the Community purse seiners 
represent around 1% of the total purse seine fishery dominated by fleets from Asia and from Pacific 
Island countries. The following graph demonstrates that the main fishing grounds of the European 
purse seine fleet remain the Indian Ocean (70% of the 400,000 tonnes caught annually by the EC 
purse seiners worldwide), preceding the Atlantic Ocean (22%). Catches in the whole Pacific Ocean 
represent only 8% of total Community purse seiners catches. 
 
                                                 
20 Information obtained during the mission and later confirmed by the European professional association 
concerned. 
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Figure 11 : Distribution of catches of the EC purse seine fleet between the main oceanic regions. Source: 
RFMO data 
 
As shown by the following map, activities of the EC purse seine fleet took place in 2007 in the Eastern 
part of the WCP in international waters and in the EEZ of Kiribati where there the EC concluded a 
fishing agreement. The activities of the European purse seiners fall under the area of competency of 
two RFMO: the IATTC for the Eastern Pacific Ocean and the WCPFC for the Western-Central Pacific 
Ocean. Exploitation of tuna resources in this area occurs when fishing in the Eastern Pacific Ocean is 
not possible (time - area closures) or when catches are low (such as in 2007). The strategy of the EC 
purse seine fleet is primarily to supply the Ecuadorian canneries in which Spanish nationals have 
shares, but also to supply canneries based in Pago Pago (American Samoa) and even Bangkok 
(Thailand). So far, there has not been any Spanish investment in processing factories located in 
Pacific Island Countries. 
 
As the following map suggests, EC purse seiners fishing grounds were far from the Solomon in 2007 
and preceding years.  
 
 
Figure 12 : Distribution of Spanish purse seine catches in 2007. Source : SPC 
 
However, it should be noted that the operations of the fleet extended westward in 2008 with some 
catch declared in the Solomon EEZ (630 tonnes) accompanied by a substantial increase of catch in 
the EEZ of Kiribati. Activities in the High-Seas under competency of WCPCF also increased. This is 
 Solomon Islands 
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demonstrated by the following table that shows the evolution of catch under the three existing FPAs as 
well as in all the WCP area (EEZ and high seas). The total WCP total catch made in 2008 (36 205 
tonnes) are a new record and close to catch of the Spanish purse seine fleet in the Atlantic in 2007. 
 
Table 10: Evolution of the catch of the EC purse seine fleet in the three EEZ of third countries having 
signed a FPA (source : DG MARE) and total catches in the whole WCP area (EEZ as above high seas ; 
source SPC) 
Tonnes 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Solomon Islands   0 0 627 
Kiribati 624 607 2 799 8 671 12 269 
FS Micronesia    0 0 
Total EEZ under FPA 624 607 2 799 8 671 12 896 
      
All WCP area 5 519 3 432 10 862 19 747 36 205 
 
For the future, the European purse seine shipowners declare having a need to retain an access to the 
WCP area. The main reason is that the evolution of the management and conservation framework in 
the Eastern Pacific may lead to reduce significantly the fishing possibilities if the seasonal closures are 
to be adopted as proposed by the IATTC (2.5 to 6 months per year), notwithstanding the restriction on 
fishing tuna associated with dolphins. The EC shipowners have already anticipated that by creating a 
transhipment base on Christmas Island in Kiribati. The location of this base is central and adapted to 
deploy westward in the WCP area and eastward in the EPO area.  
 
It should also be known that the activities of the purse seiners under the EC flag represent only a part 
of the Spanish deployment strategy in the WCP area. Spanish interests reportedly control also purse 
seiners under the Ecuador flag (7), Salvador flag (2) as well as two vessels flying the flag of Kiribati 
(one purse seiners and one pole & liner). Catch of those vessels are used mostly to supply the 
Spanish co-owned canneries located in Central America. 
 
2.5.2. Longliners 
 
The activities of the European longliners operating in the Pacific Ocean take place primarily south of 
20°S, outside the tropical area, where the swordfish resource is more plentiful. The fishing grounds 
overlap the area of competency of both IATTC and WCPCF. As shown in the two following maps, 
catches in the WCP originate essentially from the high seas East of New Zealand or from the EEZ of 
French Polynesia but mainly as a continuation of fishing activities in the Eastern Pacific area. 
 
 
Starting in 2003 the EC fleet, consisting in 10-15 surface longliners, made an attempt to expand its 
fishing grounds towards zones in the Central South Pacific, with the area around 120º W becoming a 
new fishing zone, as an alternative to supplement the traditional grounds located closer to the South-
America mainland in the SE Pacific. In 2004 and 2005 experimental fishery activities were undertaken 
in areas located in both the North and South Pacific, within the WCPFC convention area, which may 
explain why licences were drawn under the agreement with Solomon although no catch have been 
declared. These experimental fishery activities involved the development of fishing patterns that were 
different from those used in routine commercial operations. Over the course of this activity, substantial 
differences were found in terms of the prevalence among the species caught, in both the target 
species as well as the bycatch species. The EC longliners returned to their traditional fishing grounds 
after estimating that the continuation of their usual fishing strategy targeted on swordfish and oceanic 
sharks is more adequate than trying to enter and compete on the equatorial longline fishery for 
sashimi or albacore dominated by Asian interests. 
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Figure 13 : Distribution of Spain swordfish catches 2000-2006. Source : WCPFC 
 
 
Figure 14 : Distribution of fishing effort of the Spanish longline fleet in 2006. Source : WCPCF 
 
It is therefore unlikely that there could be an interest for future surface longlining possibilities in the 
tropical area including the Solomon Islands EEZ.  
 
2.6. The tuna fisheries under the competency of Solomon Islands 
 
2.6.1. The Domestic tuna fishery 
 
In 2007, there were 14 tuna fishing vessels flying the Solomon Islands flag active in the WCP area. 
Five of these vessels are purse seiners operating mostly in the national EEZ, and 9 are pole and line 
vessels also operating in the EEZ. Fishing within the EEZ of neighbouring coastal states is possible 
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via entering into bilateral fishing access agreements and sub-regional arrangements for Purse Seine 
fishing under the terms of the FSM Arrangement. Four of the five purse seiners are owned by the 
company National Fisheries Development Ltd, a subsidiary of the tuna trading company Trimarine. 
The Pole and Line vessels are property of Soltai Fishing and Processing Company Ltd, an integrated 
company operating tuna processing facilities in Noro, with a 51% shareholding held by the National 
Government and the remainder by the Western Province Government. The evolution of the Solomon 
tuna fishing fleet over the past six years shown in the following table indicates that the number of 
purse seiners has increased from 2 in 2002 to 5 in 2007 while the number of pole & line vessels 
decreased from 12 in 2002 to 9 in 2007. Domestic longlining has been progressively phased out from 
the National fleet. 
 
Table 11 : Number of Solomon Islands Purse-Seine, Longline and Pole & Line active vessels in the WCP 
Area. Source: Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Longline 11 9 8 5 -- -- 
Purse seine 2 3 3 3 4 5 
Pole & Line 12 12 10 7 11 9 
TOTAL 25 24 21 15 15 14 
 
Total catches of Solomon tuna vessels in the WCP area vary between 20 000 and 30 000 tonnes per 
year over the last few year. The purse seine fleet recorded an increase in efforts through the number 
of days vessels spent searching for fish and fishing as depicted through 268 days in 2002 to an 
increase of 614 days in 2007. The total annual estimated catches increased from 6,782 tonnes in 
2002 to 22,313 tonnes in 2006, the highest in 6 years.  
 
However, in the same period, pole & line annual catch estimates fluctuate due to changes in fleet 
sizes and financial problem faced by the fishing companies. The pole & line fleets recorded its highest 
total annual catch estimates as 10,793 tonnes in 2003. The performance of the pole & line fleet over 
the recent period is below expectations. Soltai Fishing docked most of its ageing pole & liners. This 
was further compounded by high fuel cost that made it more inefficient to operate pole & line boats. 
Other factors include unfavourable fishing conditions especially in the first half of the year and fishing 
downtimes due to boat repairs and maintenance. In 2009, none of the Soltai pole & liners operated on 
a commercial basis. 
 
Table 12 : Annual Catch (tonnes) and effort for Solomon Islands tuna fleet.  Source : Ministry of Fisheries 
and Marine Resources 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Catches 956 781 967 9   
Longine 
Effort -- -- -- --   
Catches 6 782 15 191 17 043 16 425 22 313 17 306 
Purse seine 
Effort (days) 195 371 437 327 424 614 
Catches 9 786 10 793 6 882 3 599 6 988 4 003 
Pole & Line 
Effort (days) -- 1 942 1 102 1 020 1 640 1 044 
        
TOTAL Catches 17 524 26 765 24 892 20 033 29 301 21 309 
* provisional 
 
The vast majority of catch of the domestic tuna fleet is unloaded / transhipped in the ports of Solomon 
(Honiara, Noro, Tulagi). 
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2.6.2. The Foreign tuna fleet in Solomon waters 
 
¾ Fleets 
 
Solomon Authorities grant access to the national EEZ to a large number (c. more than 300) of tuna 
vessels (purse seiners and longliners) flying flags of China, Fiji, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vanuatu, USA 
and the EC. According to the information supplied by Solomon Authorities to WCPCF, the breakdown 
of the foreign fleet by type of vessels and nationality is as shown in the following table. Note that these 
data do not include the four Spanish purse seiners duly licensed each year from 2006 for unknown 
reasons. Overall, there were 125 tuna purse seiners licensed to fish in the EEZ of Solomon Islands, 
roughly 60% of the WCP purse seine fleet. The 4 Spanish purse seiners represent a modest 3% of the 
total number of purse seiners licensed in Solomon waters, and 1% of the total number of foreign 
vessels. Nonetheless, the EC fleet generates slightly less than 6% of access fees paid by DWFNs to 
Solomon Islands. 
 
Table 13 : Number of foreign vessels licensed to fish in the Solomon EEZ by flag and by gear type.  Source 
: Minisry of Fisheries and Marine Resources 
Flag 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Purse seiners (PS) 
China 6 6 6 6 
Japan 21 32 26 34 
Korea 28 28 28 28 
New Zealand 4 4 4 4 
Taiwan 29 31 33 33 
Vanuatu 5 3 7 8 
USA 19 11 13 12 
Sub-total PS 112 115 117 125 
Longliners (LL) 
Belize    5 
China 12 14 24 41 
Fiji 3 3 18 12 
Japan 9 19 31 33 
Korea 16 19 37 47 
Taiwan 19 30 33 36 
Vanuatu 11 11 10 10 
Sub-total LL 70 96 153 184 
Pole and liners (PL) 
Japan 11 11 24 8 
Sub-total PL 11 11 24 8 
     
TOTAL 193 222 294 317 
 
The table shows that the major international partners of Solomon for access are Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, with China emerging as a major partner for the longline fishery. The highest ever number of 
tuna vessels licensed in Solomon waters in 2007 reflects the high abundance of fish in the area in 
connection with the well-established La Niña state, which persisted into the 2nd quarter 2008. Fishing 
activity during 2007 remained concentrated in the PNG, FSM and Solomon Islands area and was 
restricted from extending east beyond the 175°E longitude (compared to activity in recent years) due 
to cooler surface water temperatures flowing in from the east, in line with the prevailing ENSO 
conditions. Current forecasts indicate that an El Niño situation is likely for the end of 2009 through 
2010 meaning that the EEZ of Solomon Islands will be less attractive for the Distant Water fleets. 
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¾ Catches 
 
Catch of foreign purse seiners in the Solomon EEZ are usually around 60 000 tonnes per year. 
According to the Ministry, catch would have surpassed 80 000 tonnes in 2007. Korea with 44% of 
purse seine catch is the major fishing nation, ahead of Taiwan and Japan (12% each of total purse 
seine catch). Purse seine catch in Solomon EEZ represent 5% of total purse seine catch in the WCP 
area (1,700,000 tonnes in 2007). 
 
Catch of foreign longliners in the EEZ of Solomon are estimated at 4,600 tonnes for 2007. However, 
actual catches are believed to be higher as some foreign fleets reportedly supply incomplete data to 
the National Authorities. 
 
¾ Port activities 
 
As a general rule, transhipment at sea by purse seiners is prohibited. The measure is part of the 
WCPCF convention that entered in force in 2004, and also part of the FFA minimum terms and 
conditions applicable to purse seiners. As a consequence, all transhipment / unloading operations 
have to take place in designated ports under the supervision of control officers and subject to payment 
of fees. 
 
SPC data based on logsheets submitted by the purse seiners provide an estimate of catch unloaded / 
transhipped in Solomon ports (Honiara, Noro, Tulagi). Data for the most recent years indicate a 
dramatic increase of quantities of tuna transhipped in Solomon ports, from less that 25,000 tonnes in 
2003 to nearly 150,000 tonnes in 2007. This increase is underpinned by the transhipment ban in force 
since 2004 and by the fishing conditions prevailing over 2007. Assuming an average quantity of 800 
tonnes per purse seine transhipment operation, number of transhipments would have increase from 
100 in 2006 to 180 in 2007. As shown in the following table, about 50% of transhipment in Solomon 
ports originates from the Korean purse seine fleet. Other entities transhipping in Solomon are the 
domestic fleet, the Taiwan fleet and the Vanuatu fleet, each representing 10-12% of total 
transhipments. According to SPC data, EC vessels transhipped approximately 2,000 tonnes in 
Solomon in 2007 for the first time since 2003. Additional transhipment operations occurred in 2008 but 
to an unknown extent as yet. 
 
Table 14 : Tuna transhipped / unloaded (tonnes) in Solomon Islands by reporting flag. Source: SPC 
Flag 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Spain         2 155 
Micronesia 3 113 6 522 3 035 646 1 860 
Japan     525 1 595 2 699 
Kiribati         690 
Korea 8 020 21 965 26 815 38 096 79 698 
Marshall Isl.       880   
New Zealand 1 216   88 1 209   
Papua New Guinea 5 190 14 120 17 736 4 987 7 475 
Solomon Is.     3 747 14 959 13 198 
Taiwan 5 838 16 773 21 106 9 934 13 876 
USA   943   2 266 4 943 
Vanuatu   2 748 4 865 7 957 17 407 
TOTAL 23 377 63 072 77 917 82 530 144 001 
 
The following figure shows that Solomon Islands increased their market share over the last few years. 
However, Papua New Guinea and Federated States of Micronesia remain the main transhipment / 
unloading places in the WCP area with 200,000 to 250,000 tonnes per year each.  
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Figure 15 : Tuna transhipped / unloaded from the purse seine fleet by port country. Source: SPC 
 
2.6.3. Access agreements concluded with other flag States 
 
¾ Bilateral access agreements 
 
Solomon Authorities conclude a number of bilateral access agreements with foreign associations of 
vessels owners of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, New Zealand, and with the European Community. 
The following details information that could be obtained on the content of some of these bilateral 
agreements for previous years. 
 
Agreement with the Taiwan Deep Sea Tuna Boatowners and Exporters Association for Purse 
Seine fishing (Agreement for 2007 concluded end 2006) 
 
The agreement does not set limits on the number of boats or the maximum catch permitted. 
 
Each boat has to pay a permit fee of USD 1,000 (€ 730) and an access fee of USD 15,000 (€ 10,950). 
According to the Ministry, this amount is intended to represent 5% of the value of the catch. There is 
no provision in the agreement to review the access fee on the basis of actual quantity caught or value 
of the catch. In addition, each vessel has to pay an observer fee of USD 1,500 (€ 1,095) to the 
National Observer programme administered by the Government. 
 
Concerning access conditions, the agreement includes exclusion from archipelagic or inshore waters, 
submission of weekly catch reports, entry / exit declaration, submission of logbooks, prohibition of 
transhipping and refuelling at sea, position reporting to FFA with a Government-approved VMS 
system. The agreement does not include obligation of hiring national crew members, nor to supply the 
local tuna industries. 
 
Agreement with the Japan Far Seas Purse Seine Fishing Association (Agreement for 2007 
concluded end 2006) 
 
This agreement contains provision for fishing tuna in the EEZ of Solomon Islands with purse seine, 
longline and pole and line. 
 
Purse seine 
 
Each licensed vessel is entitled to catch up to 8,000 tonnes per year (equivalent to the total likely 
catch of one vessel). The agreement does not set a limit on the maximum number of vessel. 
 
Each purse seiner has to pay a permit fee of JPY 100,000 (€ 620) and an access fee equivalent to 5% 
of catch value: the vessel pays an initial access fee of JPY 1,000,000 (€ 6,200) with adjustment to be 
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made, when 5% of the actual catch value exceeds this amount. The agreement details the calculation 
method which is based on catch information for each trip for quantities and three month weighted 
running average price at Yaizu for unit prices of catches. In addition, each licensed vessel is expected 
to pay a contribution of JPY 120,000 (€ 745) to the National Observer programme administered by the 
Government. 
 
Access conditions are identical to those negotiated with Taiwan (see above). 
 
Longline and Pole & Line 
 
The maximum allowable catches within the Solomon EEZ for Japanese permitted fishing vessels is 
6,000 tonnes for pole and line fishing vessels and 6,500 tonnes for longline vessels per permit period. 
 
Both categories of vessels have to pay a permit fee of JPY 100,000. The access fee is intended to be 
5% of catch value. The agreement sets the level of access fees to be paid by longliners on the basis of 
past fishing years, equivalent to JPY 3,410,000 per vessel for the whole year (€ 21,150). Pole & Liners 
are also subject to a 5% access fee based on an average figure for catch per trip (160 tonnes) based 
on previous fishing years. A contribution to the National Observer programme of JPY 120,000 per 
licensed vessel is also expected. 
 
Agreement with the European Community 
 
The agreement is negotiated for a maximum of 4 purse seiners and 10 longliners without limits on 
catches (the reference tonnage of 6,000 tonnes can be exceeded).  
 
Each EC purse seiner has to pay an advance payment of € 13,000 equivalent for the fees due for 371 
tonnes of tuna. The licence fee for an EC longliner is € 3,000 equivalent for the fees due for 80 tonnes 
of tuna. Each additional tonne caught is charged € 35. EC vessels have to pay each a € 400 
contribution to the Observer programme. The contribution paid by EC purse seiners represented 5% of 
catch value in 2006, but slightly more than 3% in 2007 and 2008 when prices increased. Contribution 
of longliners is equivalent to less than 1% of price of target species. However, considering the 
contribution of EC shipowners and payments from the Community, each tonne of tuna caught in 
Solomon EEZ under the agreement is worth € 100 (€ 35 borne by shipowners, € 65 borne by the 
Community). This represents 13% of catch value in 2006 and almost 10% in 2007 and 2008. For EC 
longliners, the contribution negotiated under the agreement represents less than 3% of the catch 
value. 
 
Other access conditions to the EEZ of Solomon are broadly identical to those imposed to Japanese or 
Taiwanese fleets. However, the Protocol attached to the FPA stipulates that EC fishing vessels shall 
undertake to employ Solomon nationals onboard, or to pay a lump sum equivalent to the wages of two 
crew members. According to the EC shipowners, no Solomon seamen have been hired on licensed 
fishing vessels mainly for practical reasons. On the other hand, neither the shipowners nor the EC 
have received a claim for compensation from the Solomon Islands Authorities. 
 
Other bilateral agreements 
 
The content of the other bilateral agreements concluded by Solomon Authorities could not be 
consulted (Korea, China, New Zealand). At least for Korean purse seine fleet, the main fleet present in 
the EEZ, the access fees are reportedly comparable to fees paid by Taiwan or Japan, i.e. 5% of the 
value of catch. It is not known however whether these access fees are lumped or subject to 
adjustments based on actual catches, as are the access fees payable by Japan or EC purse seiners. 
Report FPA 20/SLB/09 
- Page 41 - 
 
Update on the bilateral agreements concluded by Solomon Islands in 2009 
 
According to information received during the mission, all the Distant Water fleets mentioned above 
retained access to the EEZ of Solomon Islands in 2009 through renegotiated bilateral agreements. 
There are however two major changes: 
 
• The level of contribution of the Distant Water fleets could be increased to 6% of the value of 
the catches (Korea, Taiwan). Only Japan could not accept an increase from 5% to 6% on 
the ground that the agreement with Japan also includes provision of goods and services to 
the Solomon Authorities (contribution in kind like provision of computer equipment, fishing 
gears, technical assistance) supplied by the OFCF upon specific requests from the Solomon 
Ministry of Fisheries. 
 
• The recent bilateral agreements also incorporate the requirements of the Vessel Days 
Scheme adopted by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement and in force since 2008. Solomon 
Islands Authorities included in their bilateral agreements a maximum number of days that 
could be used in the Solomon EEZ by the foreign purse seine fleets to stay within the limits 
imposed of its PAE. The value of the agreements remains however negotiated on the basis 
of a percentage of the catch value. It has not been attempted to sell fishing days to foreign 
operators on the basis of whatever unit value. Rather, the number of days allowed by 
Solomon Islands is basically seen as a conservation measure. 
 
¾ Multilateral agreements 
 
Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries between Certain Governments of the Pacific Island States and 
the Government of the United States of America (commonly referred to as the "US Treaty") 
 
Negotiated for the last time in 2003 until 2013, the US Treaty provides access to a maximum of 40 
purse seiners to the waters of the 16 Parties21 to the Treaty. The structure of the US Treaty is 
summarised below. The US Party pays a total of USD 21 million per year including USD 18 million 
paid by the US Government on the USAid budget22 and USD 3 million paid by the US shipowners 
independently from the actual catches or number of active vessels. The value of the US Treaty is 
reportedly indexed on tuna ex-vessel prices. These amounts are disbursed as follows: 
 
• First, an administrative budget is deducted from the total amount (approximately USD 
500,000) for FFA Treaty administration; 
• Second, Project Development Funds are deducted from the balance. Currently, the Fund 
totals USD 2.5 million annually. This money is distributed equally among the Pacific Islands 
and is made available upon project requests; 
• From the remaining balance, 15% is distributed equally among all Pacific Islands, 85% is 
distributed according to where the catch is made (i.e. those countries that incur greater fishing 
pressure get a greater share of the 85%). 
 
The Forum Fisheries Agency, along with the Treaty depositary (the Government of PNG) are 
responsible for the completion and circulation of the agreed upon Treaty text. It is not currently in the 
public domain. 
 
 
                                                 
21 The parties are the 8 Parties to the Nauru Agreement - the PNA - (Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Isl., Nauru, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu) plus 8 other non-PNA Pacific countries (Australia, 
Cook Islands, Fiji, New Zealand, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu).  
22 Managed by the Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs (OES), Dept of States 
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Figure 16 : Structure of the US Treaty 
 
In addition, the US industry pays the equivalent of USD 164,000 per year as a contribution to the FFA 
observer fund. This contribution is the result of a formulae based on an observer coverage of 20% of 
the fishing trips realised by the US purse seiners23 in the waters of the PNA. 
 
Several factors have decreased the number of US purse seine vessels operating in the WCP area 
from an average of approximately 40 per year in the 1990s, to only 13 in 2007. Catches of the US fleet 
in this last year have been approximately 72,000 tonnes, putting the value of the agreement at an 
estimated 19% of the value of the catches. However, the US fleet is currently in a rebuilding phase (39 
US purse seiners were reportedly active in the WCP area in 2008-2009 including 14 which are brand 
new24), which should improve the cost benefit ratio of the multilateral agreement. Assuming the US 
purse seine fleet at full capacity catch a conservative 175,000 tonnes of tuna25, the multilateral 
agreement is worth USD 120 per tonne, i.e. equivalent to the € 100 per tonne paid by the EC, but with 
a different balance between private and public funding (14% private - 85% public for the US Treaty, 
35% private - 65% public for the EC fisheries agreements). 
 
The parties to the Treaty meet annually to monitor the implementation of the multilateral agreement. 
The 21st Annual Consultation between the Pacific Island Parties and the United States was held in 
March 2009. 
 
According to a communiqué published by FFA, outcomes of the consultation included: 
 
• The US confirmed the application of recently agreed measures by the Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (such as high seas 
pockets closure, periodic FAD bans, 100% observer coverage and catch retention) to its fleet.  
However, further discussions will continue between the US and the Pacific Island Parties on 
how these measures will be implemented within the framework of the US Treaty. 
• The US agreed on the normal budget to cover observer coverage on US vessels and further 
discussion is on-going on the budget needed for the 100% observer coverage during the 
periodic FAD closure in the 2009/10 licensing period that commences in June 2009. 
• The US and Pacific Island Parties agreed to further cooperation on catch and effort data 
sharing and port sampling. 
                                                 
23 The formulae has been reportedly revised recently but it is not in the public domain. 
24 Source : FFA Trade News, March April 2009. 
25 Example in 1998 when 39 US purse seiners declared 174,600 tonnes of catch. Logically, catch nowadays 
should be higher due to technical creep, lowering the unit value of catch. 
Report FPA 20/SLB/09 
- Page 43 - 
• The US agreed that the FFA/VMS MapInfo baseline coordinates for the Pacific Island Parties 
are to continue to be used for the purpose of the Treaty, including for enforcement work 
arising under the Treaty, until such coordinates are officially varied by the respective Parties. 
• Renegotiation of the Treaty for a new arrangement beyond 2013 when the current Treaty 
arrangement will lapse, will commence in late 2009 between the Pacific Island Parties and the 
US. 
• The US agreed that the list of US fleet vessels, with names of ships, licence holders and other 
basic details will be made publicly available on the web 
• The next annual consultation will be in March 2010. 
 
Issues still to be resolved include whether or not the Pacific Island Parties and US will agree on 
application of the Vessel Day Scheme to the US fleet and the number of fishing days the US fleet will 
receive. The Treaty is due to end on 14 June 2013 when a new treaty or other kind of arrangement will 
have to be negotiated for the US to fish in Pacific Islands’ waters. Renegotiation of the Treaty and 
discussions about the new scenarios are expected to start in late 2009.  
 
From the perspective of Pacific Island Countries, the US Treaty raises a lot of concern. The first issue 
is that the unexpected revival of the US purse seine fleet from 13 vessels up to its maximum number 
allowed (40) within one year or so is in effect due to reflagging of mostly Taiwan-controlled vessels 
previously under the flags of Pacific Island Countries as a strategy to obtain unlimited access to all the 
EEZ under the Treaty, and to bypass the stringent fishing day quota offered under VDS for 
conservation purpose26. This opportunistic redeployment is seen as unfair since i) the purse seine 
vessels concerned by reflagging are vessels that previously committed to become domestically based 
and were accordingly granted favourable access conditions (FSM arrangement) and ii) the purse 
seiners operating under the US Treaty are not constrained by the Vessel Days Scheme until it can be 
incorporated in the agreement. Forty US purse seiner operating 250 days a year could potentially 
exert a US fishing effort of 10,000 days in PNA EEZ while only 3,362 days have been accounted for in 
the calculation of the initial TAE (see section 2.4.2 page 25) according to WCPCF resolution of 
capping purse seine fishing effort to 2004 level. 
 
 
2.7. Enforcement of conservation and management measures 
 
2.7.1. Background 
 
All fishing fleets operating in the WCP regulatory area have to comply with the management and 
conservation measures adopted by the WCPCF, whether in the high seas or in EEZ of Coastal States, 
and also with the additional or complementary specific management and conservation measures that 
the Coastal States may have adopted as part of their Legal framework or as part as the specific 
conditions attached to the licence issued. The compliance and control measures include inter alia: 
 
• Good Standing on the FFA register 
• Control and Monitoring of transhipment (forbidden in the high seas and in fisheries zone, 
permitted only in designated harbours unless authorisation is granted to process otherwise) 
• Submission to Coastal State of logbooks in the zones and in the high seas (the latter 
obligation is part of the licensing conditions) 
• Vessel reporting requirement (Entry - Exit; weekly notification of catch, harbour prior 
notification) 
• Observers and observer coverage 
• Appointment of a local agent 
• Vessel monitoring system (VMS reporting) 
• Area closure (in Solomon Islands, Archipelagic waters are closed to any foreign fishing vessel) 
 
                                                 
26 Reflagging has been made possible by relaxation of the rules of membership to the US Tuna Boatowner 
Association possibly motivated by the threat of loosing unused negotiated rights. 
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While it remains the competency of coastal countries to enforce the applicable regulations in the 
waters under their jurisdiction27, FFA plays a central role in facilitating enforcement of existing 
conservation and management measures at regional level and fight against IUU fishing. The following 
paragraphs detail the main tools developed by FFA in this respect. 
 
• Vessel register: FFA maintains a register of fishing vessels28 authorised to fish in the EEZ of 
its Member countries. Vessels wishing to engage in fishing activities have to submit an 
application to FFA and pay registration fees (in 2009, USD 2,448 + USD 800 if the vessel is to 
fish in the EEZ of the PNAs). Registration is valid for one year. No foreign fishing vessel shall 
be issued with a fishing licence unless the vessel and its operator have good standing on the 
FFA Vessel Register (i.e. the vessel has a good record of compliance with MTCs, including 
VMS - see below - catch reporting, transhipment rules) and the vessel is registered on the 
WCPCF record of Fishing Vessels. As from June 2009, there were 4 EC purse seiners and 4 
EC fish carriers on the FFA register of vessels in good standing. No EC longliners were 
present on the FFA register. 
 
• VMS: FFA pools all VMS position of authorised fishing vessels in the WCP area. As part of the 
MTCs, all authorised vessels have to be fitted with an FFA-approved Automatic Location 
Communicator which sends VMS position a regular interval of time (1 hour for fishing vessels, 
4 hours for other types of vessels). Coastal countries member of FFA have real time access to 
these VMS data for fishing activities falling under their competency, i.e. fishing vessels flying 
their flags wherever they operate, and fishing vessels in the waters under their jurisdictions. 
For the EU, VMS monitoring concerns potentially the Spanish purse seine and longline fishing 
fleets, but also 2 fish carrier vessels flying the flag of Cyprus, one carrier vessel flying the flag 
of Lithuania, and another carrier vessel flying the flag of Spain that have been registered with 
FFA. In total, the fishing fleet and associated fleet monitored by FFA (as of June 2009) 
includes more than 1,100 vessels, comprising 25 bunker vessels, 103 fish carriers, 742 
longliners, 217 purse seiners and 30 pole and liners. FFA ensures that all ALC work properly 
and provide the required information, and if not, liaise with shipowners to rectify the situation. 
Vessels having a poor record of VMS transmission may be removed from the list of vessels in 
good standing and therefore not eligible for a fishing license in Member country EEZ. 
Monitoring of the fleets in the EEZ remains the competency of the Coastal States which use 
the VMS information for control and surveillance purpose as appropriate. 
 
• Observers: FFA runs an observer training programme and coordinates deployment on fishing 
vessels according to coverage rates agreed. It is up to each country to recruit and pay its own 
observer corpse and provide observers as and when needed. 
 
• Joint Patrols: FFA facilitates the organisation of joint surveillance operations. Under 
operation “Bigeye” north of Equator and operation “Kurukuru” in the southern latitudes, 
seaborne and airborne patrol resources of Member countries are pooled, with additional 
control means provided by Australia, New Zealand, France (mainly planes) and USA (mainly 
cutters). Operations include planning and preparation, training and information gathering, data 
sharing procedures, operational phase with coordination of national headquarters from a 
central ops room often located in FFA HQ, and debriefing. Funding of these operations 
originate frequently from the Australian Defence. Budgets are used mostly to support running 
expenses of coastal countries (supply of fuel for the patrol vessels). Each joint operation costs 
in the region of € 350,000. Developed countries cooperating in these joint deployment 
operations bear their own costs. 
 
• Legislation strengthening: FFA helps its member countries to update their legislative 
framework. It provides technical assistance to rewrite the legislation if it is outdated or to 
identify gaps for corrective measures. FFA ensures that the legislative framework is adequate 
to prosecute infringements made by national or foreign operators and that the penalty scheme 
                                                 
27 Solomon Islands have three patrol boats to police its EEZ and benefits from aerial surveillance activities 
undertaken regularly by New Zealand over its EEZ. A few foreign fishing vessels could be arrested, but could 
not be prosecuted due to inadequate legal provisions in current the Fisheries Act. 
28 A per FFA definitions, a fishing vessel includes any vessel that catch fish or support catching activities. This 
definition encompasses therefore fish carriers or any type of support vessels in addition to real fishing vessels 
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is sufficiently high to act as a deterrent. Beside this legal technical assistance, FFA organises 
training workshops for national law-enforcement officers (like prosecution and dockside 
boarding workshops). 
 
2.7.2. Compliance of EC fleet with the management and conservation 
measures 
 
None of the EC vessels engaged in tuna fishing in the Western Central Pacific Ocean has committed 
serious offences over the last few years. 
 
Concerning catch reporting, Solomon Islands Authorities have received a certain number of logbooks 
from the EC purse seine fleet, but cannot ascertain if coverage of fishing trips in the EEZ is complete 
or not. According to SPC which collates statistical information at regional level, coverage of 
operational data (logbooks) for Spain is low in recent years suggesting that not all logbooks are 
submitted as expected. However, aggregate data provided by IEO through the EC since 2004 have a 
high coverage. This means that regional institutions have a good grasp of global activities of the EC 
fleet in terms of number of boat operating and total catch, but have insufficient discrete data on fishing 
effort deployed (number of days fishing) and catch per unit effort. 
 
As regards VMS, three of the four EC purse seiners comply adequately with VMS rules. VMS positions 
of the fourth purse seiner are not seen by FFA. However, the vessel did not enter the WCP area, 
concentrating its fishing operations in the EPO. Concerning fish carriers, which have also to report 
through the VMS, two Cyprus and one Spanish fish carriers comply adequately. The fish carrier 
flagged in Lithuania does not report though the VMS but it is not known whether the vessel is present 
in the WCP or not.  
 
Observer coverage onboard EC vessels is satisfactory. There is a full observer coverage on each EC 
purse seiner operating in the WCP area as a consequence of the IATTC full coverage measure 
imposed on those purse seiners fishing on tuna associated with dolphins in the EPO. 
 
3. THE SOLOMON ISLANDS POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. Solomon Islands current Fishery policy 
 
As part of the Coalition for National Unity and Rural Advancement (CNURA) new policy statement 
delivered in January 2008, the Government endorsed a new strategic plan for the period 2008-2013 to 
foster the development of the fishery sector as part of the priority put on the emergence of the 
economic/productive sector in Solomon Islands. 
 
Under an overall policy goal titled “the development and sustainable utilisation of sea and marine 
resources to benefit and contribute to the well-being of the Solomon Islanders”, the strategic roadmap 
assigned to the Ministry in charge of fisheries includes 8 expected outcomes: 
 
1. Increased opportunities for rural fisherman to improve their standard of living by establishing 
on-shore fisheries and facilities and the introduction of pump-boats fishing projects 
2. Establishment of Dolphin Assessment Monitoring Project 
3. Increased potential value of fisheries and marine products by the setting-up of two tuna loin 
factory in the country 
4. Strengthen Soltai fishing and processing company of its long term and economic viability 
5. Improved Solomon Islands government earnings through the realisation of the internal value 
of the resource, and effective licensing procedures 
6. Management plans and appropriate legislations are in place for the main stocks 
7. Monitoring system in place that provide accurate and timely information on commercial and 
sustainable fisheries for all stakeholders, including regional agencies 
8. Enhanced Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources organisational capacity systems and 
skills to support the Ministry achieve its goals. 
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A corporate plan elaborated by the Ministry of Fisheries for the period 2008-2011 sets out the reforms 
and strategies that the Ministry will need to adopt if it is to convert the Government’s Sector Policies 
into acceptable outcomes. The corporate plan has been developed through a process of consultation 
with other government agencies and key stakeholders including communities, the private sector, 
donors and the civil society. It sets out a new organisation aiming at improving its own capacity to 
perform. 
 
The Ministry is currently in the process of adopting two operational strategy papers, one focusing on 
oceanic tuna fisheries, the second focusing on inshore fisheries and aquaculture, while addressing 
important crosscutting issues like the reform and the adoption of a new Fisheries Act (anticipated end 
of 2009). 
 
The oceanic tuna strategy will have as main objective to increase the profitability of commercial 
offshore fisheries and overall, to improve the value of fishery and investment led development 
opportunities providing social, fiscal and economic benefits to the country. Based on the current 
experience with shore industries, it is the understanding of the Ministry that more benefits can be 
accrued from the industrial tuna fisheries through the development of an alternative artisanal fishing 
fleet, the strengthening of Soltai economic viability and increased onshore investment in additional 
tuna processing facilities. Solomon Islands have comparative competitive advantages (cost of labour, 
availability of water, proximity to fishing grounds) compounded by the likely forthcoming increase in 
price of fuel, that can underpin the development of the tuna sector, providing thereby more 
employment opportunities in the provinces and increased State revenues. Importantly, the offshore 
strategy intends to take advantage of the new management regime of tuna fisheries (notably the 
vessel days scheme) to favour those fleets that show real interest in investment in Solomon Islands. 
Through the VDS, which does not take into account vessel nationality, Solomon Islands intends to 
reserve allocation of fishing opportunities to cooperating fleets at the expense of those fleets that 
catch tuna for other interests. Also, the offshore strategy will include consultations with other Ministries 
to improve the attractiveness of Solomon Islands to foreign investors. Korean (DongWon group), 
Japanese and Philippines (Frabelle) interests would have already started discussions with Solomon 
Authorities for new shore investments.  
 
Inshore fisheries and marine resources play a critical and unique role in the rural economy of Solomon 
Islands, supplying daily protein and serving as one of the few sources of cash for the villagers. Inshore 
fisheries support livelihood of coastal communities and contributes to political stability. The focus of 
the inshore strategy will be to develop and implement management plans for key fisheries (beche-de-
mer, trochus) and to foster aquaculture development. The Ministry intends to give more support to 
community-based management taking into account customary laws. 
 
3.2. Budgets in support of the development of the fisheries policy 
 
3.2.1. Recurrent budget 
 
The Ministry of Fisheries receives a budget from the State to cover recurrent expenditure such as staff 
salaries and social taxes, building lease, electricity, communication, … The recurrent 2008 revised 
budget was equivalent to SDB 10 million (€ 900,000), including 30% for payroll charges. 2009 budget 
forecasts stand at the same level. In 2007, the recurrent actual budget of the Ministry was 
considerably lower (€ 400,000) demonstrating that there can be considerable variations between the 
expected recurrent funding and the actual funding due to changing priorities of the Government. 
 
3.2.2. Development budget 
 
The development budget for the Ministry of Fisheries is shown in the table below. It consists in Non-
Appropriated Funds which are contributions from Donors for funding specific projects and 
administered jointly by Solomon Islands Authorities and the Donors, and Consolidated Funds accruing 
from the State Budget. The table shows the actual estimated budget established for 2007 and 2008 as 
well as the prediction for 2009 and 2010. Figures for 2007 have been extracted from the 2008 
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Solomon Islands financing regulation, while the figures for 2008 and predictions for years subsequent 
have been extracted from the 2009 financing regulation. 
 
For 2007 and 2008, the development budget for fisheries was equivalent to € 2.6 million. In 2007, 
Donor assistance represented 62% of the total development expenditures but 97% in 2008. Projection 
for 2009 anticipate a contribution from the State equivalent to the 2007 level, noting however that 
these are only estimates that may be revised during the year probably depending on external 
assistance availability. As an example, budget forecast for 2008 considered a SDB 8.6 million 
contribution from the State and SDB 11.1 million contribution from Donors with actual final figure being 
only SDB 0.6 million from the State and SDB 26.7 million from Donors. 
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Table 15: Development budget attributed to the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources. Original 
figures in SDB (above) and equivalent in € (below). Source: Financing regulations for 2007 and 2008. 
Figures in SDB Estimated actual Estimated Actual Estimate Projection
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(a) Non-appropriated funds     
EU (Stabex) Rural pearl farming 2 927 040 0 0 0
EU (Stabex) Support fishing industry export 0 0 0 0
EU (Stabex) Aquaculture development Seaweed 4 759 499 3 502 031 200 000 0
Japan specialised training fishing technology 0 182 750 182 750 182 750
Japan improvement of fishery technology 0 1 271 940 1 271 940 1 271 940
Japan Technical advisory to SOLTAI 0 1 973 700 0 0
NZ (bilateral) Institutional Strengthening 7 639 230 0   
NZ (bilateral) Organisational Strengthening  9 000 000 12 000 000 12 000 000
Bilateral fisheries agreement 1 111 136 0 0 0
NZ (bilateral) Ministry office building 0 10 800 000 4 800 000 300 000
Total Non-Appropriated funds 16 436 906 26 730 421 18 454 690 13 754 690
     
(b) Consolidated funds     
Rural fishing enterprises 9 630 000  6 000 000  
Support to rural fishers 89 500    
Tuna loins factories in Suava Bay & Tenaru  448 304 2 000 000  
Dolphin assessment  164 302   
Pole & Line boats   3 000 000  
Pearl farming investment   1 000 000  
Total consolidated funds 9 719 500 612 606 12 000 000 0
     
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE (a+b) 26 156 406 27 343 027 30 454 690 13 754 690
     
Figures in € Estimated actual Estimated Actual Estimate Projection
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(a) Non-appropriated funds     
EU (Stabex) Rural pearl farming 297 161 0 0 0
EU (Stabex) Support fishing industry export 0 0 0 0
EU (Stabex) Aquaculture development Seaweed 483 198 328 829 18 182 0
Japan specialised training fishing technology 0 17 160 16 614 16 614
Japan improvement of fishery technology 0 119 431 115 631 115 631
Japan Technical advisory to SOLTAI 0 185 324 0 0
NZ (bilateral) Institutional Strengthening 775 556 0   
NZ (bilateral) Organisational Strengthening  845 070 1 090 909 1 090 909
Bilateral fisheries agreement 112 806 0 0 0
NZ (bilateral) Ministry office building 0 1 014 085 436 364 27 273
Total Non-Appropriated funds 1 668 721 2 509 899 1 677 699 1 250 426
     
(b) Consolidated funds     
Rural fishing enterprises 977 665  545 455  
Support to rural fishers 9 086    
Tuna loins factories in Suava Bay & Tenaru  42 094 181 818  
Dolphin assessment  15 427   
Pole & Line boats   272 727  
Pearl farming investment   90 909  
Total consolidated funds 986 751 57 522 1 090 909 0
     
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE (a+b) 2 655 473 2 567 420 2 768 608 1 250 426
 
The table shows that New Zealand Aid is the main contributor to fisheries development in Solomon 
Islands with financial commitments between € 1 million and € 1.5 million per year. The focus of New 
Zealand Aid is on institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Fisheries based on the assumption that 
a developed Ministry with strong capacities is required to foster the economic growth expected from 
the fisheries sector in Solomon Islands. New Zealand started in 2006 the SIMROS programme which 
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is expected to lapse until 2009. New Zealand Aid is considering extending the funding of the 
institutional strengthening programme until 2018. Support of New Zealand under this programme 
includes training of Ministry staff, reorganisation of its corporate structure, supply and implementation 
of IT equipment, construction of a new Ministry building as well as provision of permanent and part-
time technical assistance. 
 
The other major source of funding is the EU through the 1998 Stabex funds (see section 1.4.1 page 
7). According to Ministry budget figures, contribution from Stabex amounted to nearly € 800,000 in 
2007 and € 400,000 in 2008 and focused mostly on development of income alternative for rural 
fishermen (seaweed culture and pearl farming), as well as contribution to the strengthening of the 
sanitary Competent Authority. Stabex also contributed to the rehabilitation of wharves in provinces, 
which indirectly support fisheries development. The status of the EC contribution included in the 
fisheries partnership agreement to support the implementation of the Solomon Islands fishery policy (€ 
120,000 per year over 2006-2009) is unclear. An equivalent heading and amount appears in the 2007 
budget under the non-appropriated funds category, like if this amount was considered as part of the 
Donor assistance programmes, although the EC contribution is intended to be a sectoral budget 
support. In 2008, this budget heading disappears and cannot be assumed to be fully part of the State 
budget contribution to fishery development which was equivalent to half of the amount concerned. It is 
therefore not possible to figure out how the contribution of the EC under the fishing agreement has 
been used from the analysis of the budget. Ministry staff do not have any indications either as the 
development budget is administered by the Ministry of Planning. Solomon Islands never notified the 
Community of the allocation of these € 120,000, noting however that the multiannual programme this 
contribution was supposed to support has never been defined as the partnership agreement initially 
anticipated. 
 
Finally, Japan appears as the other source of external support to fishery development in Solomon 
Islands (€ 300,000 in 2008, € 130,000 forecast in 2009). According to Ministry officials, the contribution 
from Japan is wholly part of the bilateral agreement between the two parties. It is a contribution in kind 
additional to access fees paid by the Japanese shipowners. 
 
3.3. Maritime policy 
 
Solomon Islands do not have an integrated maritime policy, and is probably far from adopting one. As 
an archipelagic State with more than 80% of the population living in rural areas in the Islands, the 
current priority of the Government is to develop an efficient and safe maritime transport framework. 
 
To pursue this objective, the Solomon Islands Government adopted the National Transport Plan for 
the 2007-2026 period to provide vision, strategies, policies, and immediate priorities for development 
of the Solomon Islands transport system. The vision states the importance of “an effective transport 
infrastructure and transport services to support sustained economic growth and social development in 
Solomon Islands.” The NTP addresses a strategic framework and direction for achieving the 
Government’s mission for the transport sector over 20 years by (i) developing transport sector 
services, (ii) developing and maintaining transport sector physical infrastructure, (iii) improving the 
competency and capacity of the Government agencies, and (iv) developing transport in the private 
sector. The NTP strategy aims to provide regular, reliable, and cost-effective shipping services to all 
areas of the country. 
 
The most difficult challenge for the Government is to secure funding for maritime transport, including 
maintenance, rehabilitation, and operation of maritime infrastructure and the provision of reliable, 
equal, and safe services in Solomon Islands. 
 
The EC, through the STABEX funds, already provides significant support to the National Transport 
Plan. About € 4.2 million have been spent on development of navigational aids, with another € 3 
million invested in the post-tsunami rehabilitation of wharves. The National Transport Plan is also 
supported by the Asian Development Bank with provision of technical assistance for institutional 
strengthening of the Ministry of Transport. Recently, the EC (STABEX) and ADB have both secured a 
joint funding of a grant to improve the safety and efficiency of domestic maritime transport services 
through (i) civil works to construct about 12 rural wharves, and (ii) establishment of a franchise 
shipping scheme (FSS) to support service provision to remote communities using an output-based 
approach. Total financial commitment is approximately € 15 million, including € 10 million from ADB, € 
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3.5 million from the EC, and € 1.5 million from the National Government. The lifespan of the project will 
be from 2009 up to 2018. 
 
Solomon Islands do not have as yet a project to connect all sea-related activities under the umbrella of 
an integrated maritime policy comparable to that adopted by the European Community. Priorities are 
on the hard side, i.e. trying to ensure that sectoral policies (transport, fisheries) are adequately funded 
and implemented. 
 
4. EX-POST EVALUATION OF THE FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT 
 
4.1. Utilisation of the fishing possibilities negotiated 
 
As shown in the following table, the utilisation of fishing possibilities negotiated has been excellent for 
the purse seiners (100% of the 4 licences have been requested by the European shipowners, 
although it appears that only 3 have been granted29). The 4 licence possibilities have all been used by 
Spanish flagged purse seiners, although Reg (EC) 563/2006 allocates 3 purse seine licences to Spain 
and one to France (actually all used by Spain as France has had no interest so far in deploying fishing 
vessels in the Pacific until present). 
 
As far as surface longliners are concerned, utilisation of fishing possibilities has been good the first 
year of the agreement (7 longliners drew licences out of a total possibility for 10). Utilisation has been 
nil the subsequent years. By Member State, Spain utilised in full its fishing possibilities the first year (6 
licenses possible according to Reg (EC) 563/2006) while Portugal used only 1 out of 4 possible. 
 
Table 16 : Summary of utilisation of the fishing possibilities negotiated under the fishing agreement with 
Solomon Islands. Source: DG MARE 
Licensing period* 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 
Purse seiners    
Fishing possibilities 4 4 4 
Licence requested 4 4 4** 
Ratio 100% 100% 100% 
    
Longliners    
Fishing possibilities 10 10 10 
Licence requested 7 0 0 
Ratio 70% 0% 0% 
* Licensing year starts on the 9th October of year N and ends 8th October of year N+1 
** One licence application is currently refused by Solomon Islands Authorities for failure to comply with VMS rules 
 
The reference tonnage set by the Protocol is 6 000 tonnes per year. No catch have been declared in 
Solomon Islands EEZ the first civil year of the agreement (2007) as no European vessel fished in the 
EEZ (see Figure 12), 627 tonnes of tuna have been caught the second full civil year (2008; 10% of the 
reference tonnage). These catch have been obtained by the two largest purse seiners of the Spanish 
fleet. None of the two other purse seiners entered the EEZ. There is no information as yet on the 
quantities caught in 2009 in Solomon EEZ, although reportedly some catch occurred. Note that the 
reference tonnage is not a quota per se, but a catch quantity used to estimate the value of the 
financial contribution paid by the EC to Solomon Islands under the Agreement on the basis of € 65 per 
tonne. 
 
 
                                                 
29 According to information received from the Commission, one Spanish Purse Seiner (Aurora B) is denied 
license in Solomon Islands EEZ by the Solomon Islands Authorities for failure to comply with VMS rules. 
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4.2. Ex post value of the agreement 
 
The total finances received by Solomon Islands under the current fishing agreement include: 
 
• The financial contribution paid by the Community onto the Government Revenue Account with 
the Central Bank (CBSI). It is € 400,000 per year since the reference tonnage has not been 
exceeded at least over the two first year of the agreement 
• The licence fees paid by the European shipowners onto the same account: each purse seiner 
has to pay an advance payment of € 13,000 equivalent to the fees due for 371 tonnes of 
catch. According to preliminary information received from the Commission, one purse seiner 
declared total catch in the EEZ of 432 tonnes (Albatun 3), i.e. 61 tonnes in excess of the 
threshold used to calculate the advance payment. These additional 61 tonnes should increase 
the cost of the license of this particular vessel to € 13,000 + € 2,135 = € 15,135. All the other 
purse seiners declared zero catch or catch under the threshold. As for surface longliners, each 
vessel has to pay an advance payment of € 3,000 equivalent to 80 tonnes of catch. According 
to information received, none of the surface longliners licensed declared any catch in Solomon 
Islands EEZ. 
• A contribution to the national observer programme paid by the European shipowners onto the 
same account lodged at the CBSI: each vessel has to pay a flat contribution of € 400 per year 
upon license application independently from its presence in the Solomon EEZ  
 
In summary, and on the basis of actual utilisation of fishing possibilities and catches in the Solomon 
Islands EEZ the first two years of the agreement, the Government Revenue Account has been 
credited a total varying between € 455,735 (2nd year) and € 477,400 (1st year) according to the 
breakdown shown in the table below, assuming all license applications have been successful. Around 
85% of these payments is made by the Community. 
 
Table 17 : Summary of payments (in €) from the European party to the Solomon Islands under the fishing 
agreement 
Licensing period 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009* 
Purse seiners 52 000 54 135 52 000 
Longliners 21 000 0 0 
Total license fees 73 000 54 135 52 000 
    
EC Contribution 400 000 400 000 400 000 
    
Contribution to observer programme 4 400 1 600 1 600 
    
Total income 477 400 455 735 453 600 
* Provisional, catch data not available 
 
The EC contribution under the Solomon Islands fisheries partnership agreement represents only 0.2% 
of the € 170 million budgeted annually by the EC for payments of all fishing agreements contributions, 
and less than 0.05% of the total budget of DG MARE (~ € 900 million annually). The agreement has 
therefore a fairly small incidence on Community budget. 
 
4.3. Economic Analysis 
 
4.3.1. Prices of target species 
 
¾ Purse seine 
 
Skipjack prices began noticeable increases after mid-2007 following a relatively flat and stable trend 
throughout 2006. Over the first half of 2008 skipjack prices took a further sharp upturn due to poor 
world supply condition. Prices relaxed during the second half of 2008, and frozen skipjack sold in early 
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2009 for less than € 900 / tonne in Bangkok. Yellowfin prices have been trending up for much of the 
period peaking in 2007. Similarly to skipjack, yellowfin prices decreased over 2008 to reach 2006 
levels. The following table shows the average annual prices obtained by the EU purse seiners over the 
last five year (in € per kg) for the two main target species. The average price is estimated assuming 
EC catch composition identical to the whole WCP purse seine fleet (85% skipjack, 15% yellowfin). 
 
Table 18 : Average annual price of the main target species of purse seiners. Source: professional 
associations 
In € / kg 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Yellowfin 0.82 1.04 1.41 1.70 1.40 
Skipjack 0.56 0.59 0.76 1.03 1.02 
Average 0.60 0.66 0.86 1.13 1.08 
 
According to market specialists, tuna prices are bound to further increase in 2009 due to fears that 
upcoming tuna fishing bans in major catching areas will squeeze the global supply for the canning 
industry. The general mood in the market is that in all major catching areas around the world prices 
will continue to show a consistent rising trend for at least the coming 4 months. Predictions tend to 
vary widely – but some traders project skipjack 1.8kg to be at around USD 1,750 per ton (€ 1,250) and 
even higher by September this year (source: Atuna.com). This price increase may contribute to 
weaken the bargaining power of the EC. Under this expected price conjunction, the contribution paid 
by the EC under fishing agreements (€ 100 per ton) would represent 8% of the ex-vessel value of fish 
whereas it was above 12% until 2006. This is still higher than fees paid by other DWFNs (5% to 6% of 
fish value on average), but the gap narrows. 
 
¾ Longline 
 
Prices of target species of EC surface longliners are shown below. The average price is estimated 
assuming 50% catch is swordfish and another 50% includes oceanic sharks, of which 75% is Blue 
shark and 25% Shortfin mako. 
 
Table 19: average annual price of the target species of surface longliners. Source: Puerto de Vigo 
In € / kg 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Swordfish 5.00 4.90 4.70 3.90 4.00 
Blue shark 0.95 0.80 1.10 0.90 0.70 
Shortfin mako 2.00 2.00 2.70 2.20 2.02 
Average 3.11 3.00 3.10 2.56 2.52 
 
The average composite price of surface longliners (€ 2.56 / kg in 2007), which operate South of 20°S, 
is about half the composite price obtained by Asian longliners (€ 5.1 / kg in 2007, source SPC) 
targeting sashimi grade yellowfin and bigeye in tropical waters (including Solomon Islands EEZ). 
 
4.3.2. Economic impact 
 
Catches of EC fleet in the EEZ were nil in 2007 and of 627 tonnes in 2008. Based on the average 
prices of target species (Table 18), the catch value was close to € 680,000 in 2008 (nil in 2007). Under 
the assumption that the gross value added created by a purse seiners can be approximated to 45% of 
turn over30, it would be slightly in excess of € 300,000. While the main part of the gross value added 
accrues to the EC (wages of EC crew plus profits), a minor part of this value added is shared with 
Solomon Islands (basically licence fees plus observer fees for approximately € 54,000 pa plus 
occasional transhipment fees) and with other third countries (mainly Ecuador for the wages of the 
foreign crew onboard the Spanish seiners and Kiribati assuming most of transhipments take place in 
                                                 
30 Ratio estimated in recent evaluations of fishing agreements adjusted to take into account increase in fuel prices 
(48% in 2006 adjusted to 45% in 2008).  
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this country). The downstream value added generated by the processing of catch in canneries benefits 
mainly to Ecuador, American Samoa or Thailand, i.e. where the catch from EC purse seiners are 
exported. No catch is directly processed in Europe although some European canneries may 
incorporate in their processing activities tuna loins prepared in the above countries out of raw material 
caught by the EC fleet. 
 
A recent overall evaluation of Fisheries Partnership Agreements31 estimated the total turnover of EC 
fleets using fishing possibilities negotiated under all fishing agreements to € 433 million per year on 
average over the 2004-2007 period (representing 6% of the turnover of the entire Community fleet), of 
which € 115 million are attributable to the EC tuna fleet. The turnover generated by the fleets fishing 
under the agreement with Solomon Islands represents obviously a fairly small share of the total 
turnover of the EC fleets under fishing agreements. 
 
However, considering the whole EC purse seine catch in the Western Central Pacific ocean (Table 10 
page 34), the 2007 EC turnover in the WCP area was approximately € 22.3 million, i.e. 19% of the 
turnover of the whole EC tuna fleet independently from where it operates, and 5% of the total turnover 
generated by all EC fleets under EC fishing agreements. Assuming the deployment strategy of the EC 
purse seine fleet in this oceanic region is underpinned by the existence of the three FPAs currently in 
force, the Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Solomon Islands can be estimated to contribute to 
this share of turnover, although modestly. Nonetheless, the contribution of the Solomon Islands 
agreement to total value of EC landings and proportionally to the total EC value added remains at a 
low level, less than 1%. 
 
4.4. Impact on employment 
 
The total manpower onboard the EC purse seiners vary between 20 and 28 crew (average 24). Out of 
these 24 crew members, it can be assumed that 8 are EC nationals, and the remaining 16 third 
country nationals dominated in the case of Pacific fishery by Ecuadorian nationals. According to the 
EC professional association of tuna purse seiners, there are no pacific islander employed onboard. 
 
Consequently, the 4 EC purse seiners engaged in Pacific fishery can be estimated to support 
employment for 32 EC nationals and 64 third country nationals, mostly Ecuadorians. These numbers 
represent obviously a very small share of the 2 250 EC nationals employed onboard EC fishing 
vessels exploiting fishing possibilities negotiated throughout all ongoing FPAs32, and an even smaller 
share of total EC employment in the catching sector (190 000). 
 
Impact on employment in Solomon Islands is minimal. No Solomon crew has been employed on the 
EC fleet although the protocol explicitly opened this possibility. Occasional transhipments of EC 
vessels in the ports of Solomon Islands offer limited workload for Nationals as operations are 
conducted side by side by the crew of the fishing vessels and the crew of the carrier with little 
interactions with shore-based industries.  
 
 
4.5. The Partnership approach 
 
The Fisheries Partnership Agreement signed between Solomon Islands and the EC and its associated 
Protocol integrates the partnership approach promoted by the Commission since the 2004 Council 
conclusion on COM (2002) 635 and now fully implemented throughout all fisheries agreement 
currently in force. In short, partnership means that the two parties agree on a multiannual programme 
with a view to defining and implementing a fishery policy promoting responsible fishing practices33. 
According to the agreement, the Solomon Islands Authorities undertake to allocate 30% of the 
                                                 
31 Overall Evaluation of Fisheries Partnership Agreements. Study contract n°17 under Framework Contract 
FISH/2006/20. Published March 2009, restricted circulation. 
32 Same source as above 
33 Based on experience from other fisheries partnership agreements, this includes measures related to fight 
against IUU fishing, support to scientific research and reduction of the impacts of fishing on the environment. 
The partnership includes also strengthening of sanitary control of fisheries products exported and promotion of 
European investment in the partner country. 
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financial compensation (i.e. € 120,000 annually) with a view to implementing the multiannual 
programme agreed upon. 
 
Based on the Protocol clauses, the multiannual programme was to be discussed and agreed upon 
within the first meeting of the Joint Committee to be held no later than three months after the entry in 
force of the agreement (i.e. 9 October 2006). The implementation of the fisheries policy support 
programme was to be reviewed by the Joint Committee which is scheduled to meet at least once a 
year. Solomon Islands were to notify the Community of the financial allocation each year also.  
 
During the first three years of the agreement, none of these clauses have been complied with. The 
Joint Committee never met, and as a result, there has been no fishery policy dialogue between the two 
parties. The Community has not received notification of the utilisation of the financial allocation 
devoted to fishery policy support. A review of the budget of the Ministry of Fisheries indicates that it is 
likely that this specific financial allocation has been used for other purposes. In spite of that, the 
financial contribution has been paid regularly. However, contrary to other fisheries partnership 
agreements (e.g. Mauritania, Guinea Bissau), the agreement with Solomon Islands do not include a 
safeguard clause whereby the Community may suspend application of the Protocol or review the 
financial allocation in the event of failure by the partner country to comply with commitments made 
with regard to implementation of its sectoral fisheries policy. The agreement with Solomon Islands 
merely considers a reduction of the share of the financial contribution devoted to fishery policy support 
if the evaluation of the progress made in implementing the multiannual programme so warrants, which 
is a rather unharmful clause. 
 
According to Commission’s services, the non-compliance with the partnership agreement clauses are 
attributable to difficulties to establish contact with Solomon Islands authorities, compounded by the 
remoteness of Solomon Islands from Europe. Note that the partnership aspects of the fishing 
agreements with Pacific Islands are totally centrally managed from Brussels by DG MARE. Unlike 
other regions (North Africa, West Africa, Indian Ocean), there is no dedicated decentralised 
Commission’s staff assigned to the monitoring of ongoing fishing agreements in the Pacific. 
 
The foregoing does not mean that there has been no contact between the Community and Solomon 
Islands under the agreement. However, they have been minimal. Solomon Islands Authorities 
submitted early 2009 to the European Commission a provisional version of the new National fishery 
policy for the 2008-2013 period, but the EC did not comment on it, at least officially. A technical 
meeting between the two parties could be organised in December 2008 in the margin of the annual 
meeting of the WCFPC to discuss general issues. Additionally, there have been regular administrative 
contacts between the Solomon Islands Authorities and the European Commission for the attribution of 
the fishing licences to the eligible European fishing vessels. 
 
In summary, it may be concluded that the partnership component of the fishing agreement has been 
virtually inexistent. It occurs also that the partnership with the other Pacific Islands having signed a 
fishing agreement with the EC (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati) is on the same low level. This 
is obviously a missed opportunity to strengthen fishery policy of the partner country, noting however 
that the regional initiatives funded under the successive EDFs appear to have a strong positive impact 
on fisheries development and on the image of the EC in the region. Incidentally, the absence of 
sectoral partnership dialogue under the Pacific FPAs can be a detrimental example for partner 
countries in other part of the world (West Africa, Indian Ocean) under FPA with the EC who strive to 
implement multiannual programmes according to Protocol clauses under the threat of reduced 
payments in case they do not achieve the objectives set. 
 
 
4.6. Main lessons learnt from the ex-post evaluation 
 
The investment of the Community in a fisheries partnership agreement with Solomon Islands was 
expected to contribute to the following objectives, which are common with all other fisheries 
partnership agreements concluded by the Community: 
 
a) safeguarding employment in the regions of the Community dependent on fishing; 
b) securing the continued existence and competitiveness of the Community’s fisheries sector; 
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c) developing, through partnership, the fisheries resource management and control capacities of 
third countries to ensure sustainable fishing and promoting the economic development of the 
fisheries sector in those countries by improving the scientific and technical evaluation of the 
fisheries concerned, monitoring and control of fishing activities, health conditions and the 
business environment in the sector; 
d) ensuring adequate supply for the Community market. 
 
Concerning objectives a) and c), the agreement with Solomon Islands has had overall a negligible 
contribution. The main reason is that the Community fleet concerned by this agreement numbers only 
potentially 4 purse seiners and 10 surface longliners, of which only 4 purse seiners have requested 
fishing licences in Solomon for all the years of the agreement. The low contribution to these two 
objectives is further compounded by the fact that fishing by licensed fishing vessels took place mostly 
out of the EEZ. This low contribution to objectives a) and c) could be expected. The recent overall 
evaluation study of all Community fishing agreements demonstrated that the Community fleet using 
fishing possibilities negotiated under all fishing agreements represents only a small percentage of all 
Community fleet outputs (in terms of production, turnover, value-added, employment and supply to the 
market). No major contribution could be expected from an agreement that represents 0.5% of all EC 
financial commitments to third countries under Fisheries Partnership Agreements. 
 
Concerning objective b), the fisheries partnership agreement has been useful to secure access of EC 
tuna purse seiners to one of the most productive tuna fishing ground in the Western Central Pacific. 
The resource targeted is highly migratory and its movements are largely driven by oceanographic 
conditions. Fishing vessels must be able to follow the resources wherever it is present, i.e. in the high 
seas as well as in the waters under jurisdiction of Coastal States, and therefore have an access to all 
key EEZs. The access to Solomon Islands waters proved useful in 2008/2009 when La Niña 
conditions prevailed over the Pacific Ocean, meaning that fish tended to concentrate in the Western 
waters. Under El Niño episode, fish migrate in the Central/Eastern part of the Pacific Ocean and is 
less abundant in Western waters, including in the Solomon Islands EEZ. Therefore, the current 
network of EC fishing agreements in the Pacific is adequate to support the deployment strategy of the 
EC purse seine fleet, noting however that an extension of this network to other PNA countries (such as 
Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea or Marshall Islands) would further complement the fishing possibilities that 
the EC purse seine fleet could use in the sub-region. 
 
Concerning objective c), the result is disappointing. For some reasons, the EC and Solomon Islands 
could never start the sectoral dialogue with a view to promoting responsible fishing practices as 
anticipated by the agreement. Consequently, the EC had no influence on fishery policy developments 
in Solomon Islands though the partnership and it is likely that the part of the financial contribution 
earmarked for support to fishery policy implementation according to the protocol has been used for 
other purposes. However, several facts mitigate the consequences of this failed partnership. Firstly, 
the modest EC contribution to fishery policy (€ 120,000) compared to the development budget of 
Solomon Ministry of Fisheries (approx. € 2.5 million per year) could not be expected to be pivotal. 
Other donors, and in particular New Zealand, have a much more influential role on policy development 
through the aid granted to the Ministry of Fisheries since 2006. Secondly, other sources of EC funding 
could be used to satisfy the fisheries development needs of Solomon Islands. One of these funding 
sources is STABEX that could be used over the last few years to support national inshore fisheries 
development as well as maritime infrastructure repairs. However, STABEX funds had to be committed 
before end 2008 and will lapse until end 2010. The other significant funding source includes the 
successive regional Pacific EDF programmes that have been used to improve scientific advice, 
strengthen data collection procedures, foster the development Pacific Islands economies or combat 
IUU fishing. Solomon Islands which are part of a region and of a sub-grouping of countries (the PNA) 
where fisheries management strategy is highly integrated could benefit from the EC regional 
cooperation strategy focusing on management of natural resource and expected to continue over the 
duration of the 10th EDF.  
 
Concerning financial conditions of access, it emerges that the contribution paid by the EC (€ 400,000 
per year) is too high compared to the economic and social impacts of the agreement. During the first 
year of the agreement, the returns for the Community are clearly negative (no catch made in the EEZ). 
For the second year, the contribution paid by the Community represents 63% of the turnover of the 
fleet while the expected proportion of turnover from tuna agreements is 8 to 12% of catch value 
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(depending on fish prices). The return in terms of value-added generated is also negative (€ 1 invested 
by the Community yielded less than € 0.75 value-added for the European sector during the second 
year, and nothing the first year). Most tuna fishing agreements concluded by the European Community 
in other part of the world have highly positive financial returns (the benchmark is that € 1 invested 
generates € 4 to € 5 value added). It is therefore likely that the value of the fishing rights under a new 
fishing agreement with Solomon Islands will have to be revised downward. Comparison with access 
fees paid by other foreign operators indicates that the € 100 per tonne negotiated by the EC is fair and 
above the price paid by other foreign interests for purse seining. The same price negotiated for EC 
surface longliners is way below the price paid by Asian operators. However, target species are not the 
same (swordfish for EC operators, sashimi grade tuna for Asian operators), and it is likely that this will 
not be an issue any longer as EC surface longliners are unlikely to be included in a future agreement 
based on the low utilisation of fishing possibilities negotiated under the current protocol and the 
current deployment strategies in the Southern latitudes of the Pacific Ocean. 
 
Finally, concerning protocol conditions governing fishing activities by Community vessels in the 
Solomon Islands fishing zone, it could be noted that they are similar to conditions imposed by 
Solomon Islands to other Distant-Water fishing nations (closed area, reporting, observers). The rules 
imposed by Solomon Islands are based on WCPCF conservation and management measures but also 
on specific management measures jointly adopted by the PNA in their EEZ.  The only major difference 
is the inclusion of an incitation to embark National seamen onboard fishing vessels in the protocol 
signed by the EC which is not part of the agreements signed with other Distant-Water Fishing Nations. 
However, the clause did not produce any effect as no seamen have been hired by EC shipowners for 
mainly practical reasons. 
 
4.7. Recommendations for the future 
 
4.7.1. Interest in continuation of the current agreement 
 
From the perspective of the European tuna purse seiner operators, there is an interest to keep an 
access to the EEZ of Solomon Islands as part of a sub-regional network of fisheries agreements. 
Although the EC purse seiners currently exploits mostly the waters under jurisdiction of Kiribati as a 
continuum of their fishing strategy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, the availability of an access to the 
EEZ of Solomon Islands can prove useful when fish concentrates in the Western waters under 
particular oceanographic conditions. In addition, the following factors compound the interest of an 
access to the EEZ of Solomon Islands: 
• The conservation and management measures adopted by IATTC in the EPO will lead to 
decrease fishing opportunities in the Eastern Atlantic (seasonal closures) for all the purse 
seine fleets. EC purse seiners will have therefore to develop alternative deployment strategies 
in the WCP area to preserve their economic viability. 
• The fishing rights in the high-seas of the WCP attributable to the EC purse seine fleet are low. 
According to CMM 2008-01, the EC purse seine fleets should limit its fishing effort to a 
maximum of 103 days per year in the high-seas which is low compared to the number of days 
of exploitation of one single purse seiner (at least 250 days per year). The alternative is to 
spend more fishing days in the EEZ of Coastal States under the framework of the VDS 
adopted by the PNA. Additionally, some high-seas pockets are subject to seasonal closures 
and FAD restrictions unilaterally imposed by PNA countries as part of their access conditions. 
The WCPFC may also enforce similar seasonal closures of high seas pockets as from 2010. 
• The price of fuel, which can represent up to 25% / 30% of the turnover of a purse seiner, is 
likely to hike again in the near future. The consequence is that EC fishing vessels will have to 
base their operations close to the fishing grounds to avoid costly steaming time. 
Consequently, if the resource concentrates in western waters of the WCP area under certain 
environmental conditions, vessel’s profitability will be improved if the fleet can access the EEZ 
of Solomon Islands, fish and unload there instead of having to steam back to the central part 
of the WCP. 
 
Concerning EC surface longliners, it appears that there is no interest to keep access possibilities in the 
waters of Solomon Islands. After conducting experimental fishing in tropical waters over 2004 / 2005, 
the EC longliners resumed operations in the southern latitudes where the target species (swordfish) is 
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more abundant. There are currently no EC surface longliners on the FFA list of registered vessel in 
good standing meaning that none of these vessels can obtain a fishing licence in any of the EEZ of 
FFA member countries. Should there be an interest from the EC longline fleet to access one of the 
EEZ of the PIC, it is likely that the FFA registration procedures would have been completed 
adequately. 
 
At EC Member States level, only Spain has an interest in keeping an access to the Solomon Islands 
EEZ for its vessels. The two other Member States that flag tuna purse seiners (France and Italy) have 
currently no such vessels in operations neither in the WCP area nor in the EPO area, and do not 
anticipate a need in the foreseeable future34. 
 
From the perspective of the European Community, there is also an interest to maintain a relationship 
in the fisheries sector with Solomon Islands: 
• In 2006, the European Community adopted a new strategy for strengthening the partnership 
with Pacific Islands, including inter alia more focused development action on sustainable 
management of natural resources. This priority is taken up by Regional EDF programmes 
which allocate substantial funding to programmes aiming at supporting regional integration of 
fishery management, developing shore industries and promoting responsible fishing practices 
(robust scientific advice, fight against IUU fishing). A Fisheries Partnership Agreement with 
Solomon Islands can underpin this strategy by providing additional support for the 
implementation of a National Fishery Policy which would complement EDF regional initiatives. 
• The Green Paper on the reform of the Common Fishery Policy35 emphasises that the 
introduction of regional forms of cooperation should be explored as a mean to better achieve 
sustainability beyond EU waters. Given the high degree of transnational integration of fishery 
management promoted by the 8 Pacific countries parties to the Nauru Agreement (incl. 
Solomon Islands), which may go as far as creating a PNA secretariat separate from FFA for 
regulating fisheries, the European Community will probably find an unique opportunity to 
conclude some kind of regional arrangement in line with the ideas promoted in the Green 
Paper. While it may take some time to negotiate a form of regional fisheries partnership 
agreement, the Community has an interest to prolong its current relationships with Solomon 
Islands, as well as with other PNA countries (FSM, Kiribati), to prepare for this major change. 
• Finally, it is part of the EC strategy to strengthen the framework of RFMOs as a mean to 
promote fishery governance. The WCPCF, to which the EC is a contracting party, has been so 
far arguably unable to introduce any measures to effectively reduce fishing mortality on key 
tuna stocks36, but the 2008 meeting of the Commission showed that PNA countries have 
considerable leverage to ensure that the WCPCF introduce compatible measures in the areas 
of international waters. A Fisheries Partnership with Solomon Islands and other PNA countries 
would contribute to ensure that the EC can be associated with PNA initiatives and 
complement their actions to strengthen the WCPFC conservation and management 
framework. Additionally, the EC will have a higher profile in WCPFC if the activities of its fleets 
are managed by public agreements. 
 
The Authorities of Solomon Islands have also an interest to conclude a new Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement with the EC: 
• Solomon Islands need foreign exchange reserves to maintain macroeconomic stability. A 
guaranteed income over at least a three year period from a Fisheries Partnership Agreement 
will provide part of the needs of the country.  
• The Solomon Islands Ministry of Fisheries has problems to secure funding to support the 
implementation of its National Fishery Policy and depends to a large extent on external aid to 
implement programmes administered by Donors. A new Fisheries Partnership Agreement with 
the EC would help to secure national funding over several years for policy development that 
are not supported by Donors, or to provide a National contribution when it is required. 
• An export-oriented tuna processing industry developed in Solomon Islands. The recent 
investment an international tuna company (TriMarine) in Solomon and the likely placing of the 
                                                 
34 France was granted one purse seine licence possibility under the current protocol (see section 4.1) but never 
used it 
35 COM(2009) 163 adopted by the Commission on 22.4.2009 
36 See for example Langley & al. - 2009 - Slow Steps Towards Management of the World’s Largest Tuna 
Fishery. Marine Policy 33, pp 271-279 
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country on DG SANCO List I of third countries authorised to export compound the prospects 
for further developments, much needed to diversify the economy away from logging. The main 
problem that this industry is facing is the lack of supply of raw material meeting the current 
requirement of the Community for import (rules of origin, sanitary standards and forthcoming 
catch certification as per Reg (CE) 1005/2008). In the event that EC purse seiners have the 
possibility to access Solomon Islands EEZ and call into its ports, the Solomon Islands shore 
industry would be in a better position to buy eligible raw material from the EC purse seine 
fleet. Additionally, the axis of the partnership focusing on promotion of investment can help to 
foster integration of EC fishing activities in the economy of Solomon Islands. 
• The new rules of access adopted by PNA (the VDS and associated measures) have as major 
consequence that fishing opportunities are no longer granted on the basis of fixed allocations 
to certain flags. The PNA have a pool of fishing days they can allocate to any party as they 
wish. Solomon Islands have had some problems with some Distant Water fishing fleet (e.g. 
Taiwan, US) and are keen to favour a party that enforces high operating standards for its fleet, 
and overall, that brings some contribution to the development of the National industry. The EC 
is considered by Solomon Islands as a responsible and accountable fishing partner. 
 
As a conclusion, it appears that there is a strong interest from the main parties to the current 
agreement to conclude a new protocol that would prolong the partnership between Solomon Islands 
and the European Community with a view to preparing a more ambitious regional agreement with PNA 
countries. 
 
4.7.2. What duration ? 
 
The Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Kiribati ends in December 2012. The current protocol under 
the Fisheries Partnership with FSM ends in February 2010, but is likely to be extended up to Feb. 
2011. 
 
If the medium term objective of the EC is to conclude some sort of regional agreement with the PNA 
countries in line with the ideas promoted in the Green Paper, the Fisheries Partnership Agreement 
with Solomon Islands could be renewed for a period of 3 years to lapse until end 2012 when the 
Kiribati agreement will expire. For practical reasons the Solomon Islands agreement could be set to 
expire on 31.12.2012 and the two other Fisheries Partnership agreements set to expire on the same 
date by means of exchange of letters. This would give to the Community approximately three years to 
prepare and conclude a regional agreement that would start on 01.01.2013, which seems realistic. 
 
Alternatively, the agreement could be prolonged for a longer period of time (i.e. 5 years) with a clause 
allowing earlier termination in case of conclusion of a regional agreement to which Solomon Islands 
would be party. 
 
4.7.3. What fishing capacity ? 
 
It is clear that a new protocol should only include fishing opportunities for tuna purse seiners. 
 
According to the VDS, the EC and Solomon Islands should agree on a maximum number of days the 
EC purse seiners could fish in the Solomon EEZ, bearing in mind that each fishing day of a European 
purse seiner is counted one and a half days for VDS purpose (i.e. negotiating 225 fishing days in the 
Solomon EEZ according to VDS gives in effect 150 fishing days to the EC purse seine fleet37). 
 
During the mission, it could not be found out how many fishing days could be allocated to the EC party 
by Solomon Islands out of its PNA allocation (PAE) of 2,361 days. The amount of fishing days for the 
EC party depends on the amount already transferred to other Distant Water fishing nations including 
Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan and New Zealand. This amount has not been disclosed, noting however 
                                                 
37 The number of days considered here and in the next sections is purely a working assumption. It does not 
necessarily reflect neither the needs of the European fleet nor a vessel-day envelope Solomon Islands may decide 
to allocate to the EC fleet. 
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that it can change when a new Management Year starts. The needs of the European fleet are not 
known either, but could be estimated using the VMS positions received by the flag State of the purse 
seiners (Spain).  
 
It would be also appropriate to set an upper limit to the number of EC purse seiners allowed under the 
agreement to avoid unnecessary competition between EC operators for access and to properly 
manage the fleet. As forecast by the current protocol, the maximum number could be 4 purse seiners, 
with possibility to increase the number of licences, providing Solomon Islands remain within the limits 
of its PNA fishing day allocation. 
 
4.7.4. What contribution ? 
 
Although one of the objectives of the VDS is to use competition between Distant-Water Fishing 
Nations for fewer fishing opportunities to increase the value of the fishing rights, and therefore sell 
fishing days at the highest rate possible, Solomon Islands continue to negotiate the price of access on 
the basis of the value of catch, using a vessel day limit for conservation purpose.  
 
On this basis, it is likely that the EC will be able to negotiate fishing rights on the basis of a price per 
tonne of tuna caught, as it is the rule across all EC fishing agreements. The current standard rate of € 
100 per tonne remains fair compared to rates paid by other fishing interests, although one could argue 
that it should be revised upward given the dramatic increase of tuna prices over these last few years. 
 
The reference tonnage set by the current agreement is obviously too high compared to the actual 
utilisation of the fishing opportunities. It is clear that a new protocol should seek to obtain better 
balance and consistency between the value of fishing rights negotiated and the likely utilisation of 
fishing opportunity by the purse seine fleet. A further constraint is that there should be some 
consistency between the number of days allocated and the reference tonnage agreed. A method to do 
that could be to consider the average catch per unit effort of a Spanish purse seiner (between 25 and 
30 tonnes per day, subject to more precise information to be obtained from IEO) and multiply this 
average catch per unit effort by the number of fishing days granted by Solomon Islands.  
 
Alternatively, the EC could seek to negotiate the cost of access in terms of fishing days only. This is a 
new approach, not used so far under any fishing agreement, but it has the potential advantage of 
being easily monitored by VMS and foremost, to get away from the recurrent problem of the reliability 
of catch declarations submitted by EC shipowners, regularly challenged by Coastal States. Assuming 
catch per day is between 25 and 30 tonne for a single purse seiner, the potential negotiated value of 
an actual fishing day paid by the EC in exchange of access could be between € 65 x 25 = € 1,625 and 
€ 65 x 30 = € 1,950, translating into between € 1,083 and € 1,300 per VDS fishing day. However, as 
stated above, it is not the current Solomon Islands policy to base the value of access on an agreed 
charge per fishing day.  
 
The final value of the EC single financial contribution to Solomon Islands under the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement will be an annual amount based i) on the reference tonnage agreed (or 
alternatively the value given to the number of days negotiated) as discussed above and ii) a specific 
amount for the support and implementation of Solomon Islands sectoral fisheries policy to be agreed 
during the negotiation. This specific amount shall be an integral part of the single financial contribution. 
It is to be determined during the negotiations. It is important to remember that Solomon Islands have 
not been granted such specific additional amount under the current protocol. The main reason is that 
the agreement with Solomon Islands has been initialled before the adoption of the 2004 Council 
conclusion on the reform of fisheries agreements. 
 
4.7.5. What conditions governing fishing activities by EC vessels in the waters 
of Solomon ? 
 
The main conditions listed in the Annex to the current protocol should remain the same, in particular 
the exclusion from Solomon Islands archipelagic waters, the compulsory distance from FADs, financial 
participation to the Observer Funds, the reporting and licensing arrangements. 
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Solomon Islands and the EC may consider removing the clause on embarkation of Solomon Islands 
seamen. Lessons from other agreement prove that this type of constraint never work on tuna vessels 
which hardly know in advance in what port the current fishing trip will end. Failure to comply with this 
clause and determination of compensatory payments often gives rise to controversy and increase the 
administrative burden for both parties. If Solomon Islands seamen present some competitive 
advantages in terms of skills or salaries compared to crewmen from other third countries, the EC 
shipowners will naturally recruit them onboard their vessels. 
 
More importantly, a next protocol should include the application to the EC fleet of the recently agreed 
measures by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (such as high seas pockets38 closure, periodic FAD 
bans, 100% observer coverage and catch retention) under the 3rd implementing arrangement. The 
next protocol should make specific reference to these measures or simply state that additional 
conservation and management measures agreed by PNA should be strictly adhered to. The financial 
contribution of EC shipowners to the Observer Funds should be revised upward to account for the new 
coverage requirements imposed by both PNA countries and the WCPFC. 
 
                                                 
38 Note that the high-seas pockets closure imposed by PNA as part of their licensing conditions is currently 
challenged by operators of some Distant Water Fishing Nations (incl. Spain) on the ground that Coastal States 
have no rights to impose conditions applying in the high-seas. However, a legal expertise conducted by FFA 
confirms the opposite. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Solomon Islands supports the deployment of 4 EC purse 
seiners in the WCP area, but overall failed to achieve its objectives. Although the small size of the 
European fishing fleet concerned was not expected to bring a significant contribution to the European 
fisheries sector as a whole, the main interest of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement was to provide a 
framework for a political dialogue on fisheries issues and for support to the implementation of a 
Solomon Islands Fishery Industry which is much needed when the National economy needs to 
diversify to find alternatives to logging. The partnership did not work at all with Solomon Islands, and 
does not work either with Kiribati and FSM. 
 
Nonetheless, it is estimated that both parties have an interest to conclude a new protocol. For 
Solomon Islands, the main interest is to maintain a relationship with the EC in the fisheries sector and 
try to develop further its EC export-oriented tuna processing industry. For the European Community, 
the main interest would be to keep a framework for a political dialogue in fisheries with Solomon 
Islands as well as with Kiribati and FSM under the other ongoing partnership agreements with a view 
to preparing a more ambitious regional agreement with the PNA countries. Given the high sub-regional 
level of integration of fisheries management policies, there are probably no best place in the World 
where the EC could implement and test the regional approach considered in the Green Paper on the 
reform of the Common Fishery Policy. 
 
Should the Fisheries Partnership Agreement be renewed, it will be important that the EC does not fail 
again to properly implement the partnership approach promoted and implemented in all other regions 
of the world. The main reason for EC’s failure to implement the partnership provisions is probably the 
lack of involvement of the Commission in the management of these Pacific agreements. The option of 
managing these Pacific agreements centrally from Brussels is not viable. The distance between the 
Pacific and Europe and the current workload of both Commission’s staff and Solomon Islands 
Authorities prevented the organisation of meeting of the Joint Committee, as well as the required 
frequent informal technical meetings. In fact, only one technical meeting with Solomon Islands 
Authorities could be organised in two years and it was held in the margin of another international 
WCPCF meeting. Consequently, the EC should strongly consider having a dedicated staff stationed in 
the Delegation of Fiji or Papua New Guinea to monitor the Fisheries Partnership Agreements with 
Pacific Islands as it is the case in Morocco, Mauritania, West Africa and in the Indian Ocean. Although 
the total EC financial contribution for the Pacific agreements is low compared to other regions (€ 1.5 
million per annum, less than 1% of EC financial commitments under all fishing agreements), there is 
no reasons for the EC not to comply with its partnership commitments. The presence of a dedicated 
staff in the Pacific would also be useful to liaise more closely with the regional organisations (WCPCF, 
FFA, SPC) working on fisheries management and fight against IUU fishing but also to prepare the 
grounds for the negotiation of a regional fisheries agreement with PNA countries, should the EC 
decide to follow this path. 
 
 
*** 
*
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